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Abstract 
We model residential land use constraints as the outcome of a political economy game between 
owners of developed and owners of undeveloped land. Land use constraints benefit the former group 
(via increasing property prices) but hurt the latter (via increasing development costs). More desirable 
locations are more developed and, as a consequence of political economy forces, more regulated. 
Using an IV approach that directly follows from our model we find strong and robust support for our 
predictions. The data provide weak or no support for alternative hypotheses whereby regulations 
reflect the wishes of the majority of households or efficiency motives. 
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1. Introduction 
Though relatively recent in human history, land use regulations are by now ubiquitous. They 
also have major economic consequences and impose enormous costs in cities such as New 
York or London. Yet, little is known about their causes or origins: the welfare economics 
view holds that they are a prime policy instrument to the benevolent planner who aims to 
correct the many market failures in land markets; the dominant political economics view  
suggests that local land use regulations correspond to the wishes of a majority of voters. To 
date, the implications of both paradigms have not been empirically tested in a rigorous and 
systematic way. A key contribution of this paper is to fill this gap. 
Our prime contribution, however, is to propose a new explanation to the land use regulation 
patterns: the influential landowner hypothesis. We start from the observation that one of the 
most salient economic effects of land use regulations is to increase the cost of future 
developments. As a result, the most important economic conflict that arises in this context 
puts the owners of developed land (who have the most to gain from regulations) against the 
owners of undeveloped land (who have the most to lose from them). As the most obvious 
winners and losers, these two groups have strong incentives to influence the regulatory 
environment. We thus build an original and simple theory in which the degree of land use 
regulation of a given jurisdiction is the result of a lobbying game in which the owners of 
developed land in the locality and the owners of undeveloped land both lobby the planning 
authorities to have their ways. We then take the theoretical implications of the model to a 
cross-sectional sample of the largest US cities and run a horserace among our influential 
landowner hypothesis, the majority voting view and the welfare economics view. Our 
paradigm finds strong and extremely robust support in the data; the other two find weak or no 
support. The implications of this set of results can hardly be overstated: the current pattern of 
land use regulations in the US is neither efficient nor ‘democratic’, in that it neither 
maximizes social well-being nor satisfies the wishes of a majority of households. 
Our theory suggests a two-stage-least-square (TSLS) instrumental-variable strategy to address 
reverse-causation and omitted-variable issues. We confront our theory to the data in both 
stages of the econometric work to identify causal effects. Our quantitative exercises reveal 
that the mechanism we uncover is economically meaningful. 
Understanding the roots of land use regulations is important for several reasons. First, housing 
is the single most important component of both homeowners and renters’ budgets, so the 
welfare consequences of land use regulations are of first order policy relevance. Second, land 
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use regulations are a recent phenomenon from a historical perspective. In the early 20th 
century, when only about a quarter of humans lived in urbanized areas, virtually no city had 
any zoning laws. San Francisco in 1880 and New York City in 1916 were early exceptions. 
Now that eighty percent of the US and over half of the world population live in cities (United 
Nations 2007), land use regulations are ubiquitous in all developed countries and present in 
many others. Little is known about the causes of this sudden and profound change. Our theory 
proposes a causal link from the increasing urbanization rates (a demographic pattern) to the 
spread of residential land use regulations (a political pattern). Third, land use regulations 
impose substantial restrictions on the property rights of landowners, they take many forms 
(e.g. zoning, growth boundary controls, building height or minimum lot size restrictions), and 
they serve various purposes (e.g. internalizing visual and fiscal externalities, rent-seeking). 
Though they differ in purpose, kind and scope, most of these regulations have one component 
in common: they act as quantitative restrictions to land use and, as such, they have a shadow 
tax equivalent. These taxes can be extremely high. Glaeser et al. (2005a) estimate that the 
‘regulatory tax’ makes up more than 50 percent of house values in places such as Manhattan 
or San Francisco. The ‘regulatory tax’ also varies considerably within and across countries 
(Glaeser et al. 2005a, b; Cheshire and Hilber 2008). Though a breadth of literature studies the 
effects of such regulations on a variety of outcomes, the literature that studies the 
determinants of land use restrictions is sparse. In this paper, we provide a theoretical 
explanation for why residential land use restrictions vary across space and we confront the 
equilibrium predictions of our model to data from the United States. By nature, our theory 
cannot explain each specific form of land use regulations; instead, we take a general view of 
how regulations are determined. The determinant we emphasize in this paper is a political 
struggle among conflicting economic interests that does not only include residents but also 
‘absentee landlords’ and owners of undeveloped land.  
In a nutshell, our theory assembles the following ingredients from the urban economics, 
political economics and industrial organization literatures: (i) land use regulations restrict the 
amount of land zoned for development or increase construction costs: either shifts the supply 
of new housing up and to the left, raising prices. This is good news for owners of existing 
stock of developed land but the extra conversion cost is bad news for owners of hitherto 
undeveloped land. (ii) As places grow over time, the share of developed land rises – and with 
it the economic power of the owners of developed land relative to the owners of undeveloped 
land. (iii) Assuming that relative economic power is monotonically transformed into relative 
political power, the outcome is that places become increasingly regulated as they develop. 
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The cross-sectional equivalent of this theoretical prediction is that places with a higher share 
of developed land should be more regulated than places with a lot of undeveloped land. 
Figure 1 (panel a) plots the share of developed residential land (or SDL, a measure that we 
construct using 1992 satellite data as in Burchfield et al. 2006) against the Wharton 
Residential Land Use Regulation Index (or WRLURI, a measure due to Gyourko et al. 2008 
and pertaining to year 2005) for our reference sample of the 93 largest US Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs): the correlation ρ = .31 is statistically larger than zero. Figure 1 
(panel b) suggests that this pattern was already visible in the data in the late 1970s (ρ = .34).1 
Figure 1 (panel c) uses the aggregate property value per square meter of developable land in 
the MSA as an alternative to SDL; its correlation with WRLURI, ρ = .25, is also meaningful. 
Note that the point of at least some regulation is to zone some areas away from development; 
thus, if the cross sectional variation of the degree of restrictiveness of residential land use 
regulations were totally random, then we would expect to find a negative correlation between 
the regulatory variable and the share residential developed land. The very fact that we find a 
positive relationship between the two is suggestive that there is something to be explained in 
the data. It also implies that the regression of a measure of regulatory restrictiveness (as the 
dependant variable) on the share of developed land (as the independent variable) will be 
downwards biased. Hence we need an exogenous source of variation that ‘explains’ the 
variation of SDL but that is unrelated to the regulatory index WRLURI; we then implement a 
two-stage least-square (TSLS) procedure. 
In our model each individual of a given population has to choose among a given set of 
locations or cities. Locations differ in exogenously given characteristics, like topography and 
natural amenities. These are our natural instruments for the TSLS procedure. Topography is 
an important determinant of building costs that are reflected in housing prices. We use the 
share of land that falls into the definition of ‘plains’ as a (negative) proxy of these costs. We 
use an MSA’s access to a major coast and its mild winter temperatures as the natural 
amenities people care about (Rosen 1979, Roback 1982, Glaeser et al. 2001, Rappaport 
2007). Individuals are obviously heterogeneous in their liking of such amenities.  To capture 
this idea, we model their location decisions as a discrete choice, with the idiosyncratic 
preferences for these amenities following a known random distribution. The important 
theoretical cross-sectional implications are that places endowed with desirable amenities (a 
                                                 
1
 We construct the share of developed residential land using 1976 data collected by aerial photographs and use 
the regulatory index constructed by Saks (2008) for 81 of the largest US MSAs.  
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preference factor) or a large fraction of plains (a cost factor) will be more developed relative 
to others (ceteris paribus). These theoretical predictions of the model find strong support in 
the first stage of our TSLS strategy. A dynamic interpretation of the model also implies that 
nice places are developed first. Past location decisions reflect desirable characteristics of a 
location that may change little over time: for this reason, we also use historical population 
density from 1880 as a first stage variable. We find that historical density is a reasonably 
good predictor of SDL. We explain in the empirical section why these are valid excluded 
instruments that are highly unlikely to be influencing the contemporary regulatory 
environment directly. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 
presents the model, with special emphasis on the theoretical predictions that we take to the 
data. Section 4 describes the data and our identification strategy and provides baseline results.  
Section 5 reports robustness checks to which we have submitted our baseline specification. 
Section 6 revisits the effect of land use regulations on city growth and Section 7 concludes.  
2. Related literature 
The restrictiveness of land use regulations varies strongly across the United States (Glaeser et 
al. 2005a, b) and Europe (Cheshire and Hilber 2008). The first empirical contribution of this 
paper is to identify the origins of this cross-sectional variation. Evenson and Wheaton (2003) 
and Glaeser and Ward (2009) regress measures of various types of land use regulations on 
historical and other characteristics of Massachusetts towns. For instance, historical population 
density (1915 in the case of Glaeser and Ward) has a positive effect on current minimum lot 
size restrictions. However, they conclude from this exercise that ‘the bulk of these rules seem 
moderately random and unrelated to the most obvious explanatory variables’ (Glaeser and 
Ward 2009: 266). Our analysis shows that looking at aggregated measures of regulation 
across the major US MSAs reveals systematic patterns. The most closely related study to ours 
is Saiz (2008) and the papers complement each other in important ways. For each MSA in his 
sample, Saiz builds a measure of developable land and regresses WRLURI on this measure. 
His findings suggest that cities with a relatively small fraction of developable land are more 
regulated. By contrast, we create a measure of developed land (SDL) that has developable 
land at the denominator.2 Therefore, we take the physical constraints to expanding human 
                                                 
2
 Saiz (2008) excludes water bodies, wetlands and slopes of 15% or more to construct his measure of 
developable land. We use a comparable dataset, except that we base our definition of non-developable land on 
land cover data. In doing so, we follow Hilber and Mayer (2009). See also Burchfield et al. (2006). 
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settlements in existing MSAs as given and, guided by our theory, we aim to understand how 
the fraction of land actually developed influences regulation, emphasizing political economy 
mechanisms. Our model also suggests that the most desirable places should indirectly be the 
most regulated. This accords well with Glaeser et al. (2005a), who find that the regulatory tax 
is highest in Manhattan and in the Bay area (exceeding 50% of house values), while they find 
no evidence for a regulatory tax in places such as Pittsburgh or Detroit. In addition, our paper 
enables us to shed a new perspective on some of the results unveiled by Burchfield et al. 
(2006). For instance, they find that cities with better natural amenities sprawl more than 
others – likely because of minimum lot size restrictions that reduce the capital-to-land ratio. 
In the model, we attribute this phenomenon to endogenous land use constraints; in our 
empirical work, we find that locations with more desirable amenities are more developed and 
more regulated. 
Like Fischel (2001) and Ortalo-Magné and Prat (2007), we understand land use regulations as 
the outcome of political economic forces at work. These authors assume that local planning 
boards cater to the interests of local residents and implement the policy chosen by majority 
voting. In particular, Fischel’s ‘homevoter hypothesis’ postulates that homeowners – who 
elect planning boards – favor regulations because it raises their property value and, in turn, 
suggests that jurisdictions with a larger share of homeowners should be more regulated. 
Figure 1 (panel d) plots the homeownership rate against the WRLURI index of regulation; the 
negative correlation rejects this hypothesis (ρ = -.28). We systematically control for (and 
address endogeneity concerns related to) the homeownership rate in our regressions. Our 
findings provide at best weak support for the homevoter hypothesis. By contrast, we assume 
that landowners lobby and influence planning boards and that these implement policies that 
maximize land value as a result. Such policies, by catering to ‘land based interests’ (Molotch 
1976), may then hurt consumers and overall welfare, as stressed by Brueckner (1995) and 
Helsley and Strange (1995).3 Fischel (2001) views his ‘homevoter hypothesis’ as applying 
foremost to small, suburban areas (e.g. Dehring et al. 2008). Thus, crossing his results with 
ours suggests that local authorities may take democratic or efficient decisions on local issues 
but that they neglect the external effects this has on the metro area as a whole. 
A dynamic interpretation of our model is consistent with findings of Fischel (2004), Rudel 
(1989) and Gyourko et al. (2008). According to Fischel (2004), land use regulations originate 
                                                 
3
 Epple et al. (1988) also develop a model in which owners of developed land (‘early arrivals’ in their 
terminology) impose policies that hurt later entrants when they control the political agenda. 
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within larger cities and then zoning spreads quickly to the suburbs and surrounding towns as 
the city grows. The most direct evidence that the timing and restrictiveness of zoning is tied to 
the distance from the central city comes from Rudel (1989) who shows that the Connecticut 
municipalities located at a greater distance to New York City adopted land-use laws later than 
those closer to the Big Apple. Gyourko et al. (2008) document that municipalities within 
MSAs tend to be more highly regulated than their counterparts outside of MSAs.  
In our empirical analysis we find that regulations slow down new development, confirming 
the findings of Quigley and Raphael (2005) for California or Glaeser and Ward (2009) for 
Boston. There is thus a two-way relationship between regulation and urban development. Our 
estimates imply that a one standard deviation difference in MSA-level SDL in 1976 results in 
a roughly 2 percentage point-decrease in the growth of housing supply between 1990 and 
2000 via differentially affecting regulatory restrictiveness during the late 1970s and 1980s. 
This accounts for about 15 percent of the growth in new construction during that period. 
We contribute to the theoretical literature in two ways. First, our combination of a discrete 
choice model and of a standard monocentric city (MCC) model for ‘macro’ (across-city) and 
‘micro’ (within city) location decisions, respectively, is unique in the urban economics 
literature. This combination provides a useful generalization of the currently available 
extreme versions of the MCC model, whereby each city is either fully isolated (‘closed’) – the 
population supply to each city is inelastic and utility varies across cities – or small and fully 
‘open’, that is, the utility level is exogenous and population supply is infinitely elastic 
(Brueckner 1987). In our model, both city sizes and average utility levels vary across MSAs 
and are determined endogenously. Second, jurisdictions set their policies non-cooperatively 
and a jurisdiction’s policy spills over to other communities because consumers are mobile, as 
in Brueckner (1995) and Helsley and Strange (1995). In our model, the Nash equilibrium in 
land use regulations exists and is unique under fairly mild conditions; Helsley and Strange 
(1995) use a model in which at least one jurisdiction is inactive and acknowledge that ‘it is 
not possible to consider population controls when all communities are active without 
substantially modifying [their] model’ (p. 456). We propose one such modification. 
3. The model 
The set of players and the timing of the game are as follows. In stage 1, the planning boards 
of a set of jurisdictions simultaneously choose a zoning policy, taking the other planning 
boards’ choices as given. In stage 2, households make location decisions of two kinds. They 
first choose a jurisdiction where to live; a bidding process for land then allocates households 
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within each jurisdiction. Finally, payoffs are realized. The equilibrium concept is a (subgame 
perfect) Nash equilibrium in zoning policies. We now formally describe the set of players, 
their strategy sets and their payoff functions. 
3.1. Households’ location choice 
In stage 1, a continuum of H households indexed by [0, ]h H∈ allocate themselves to a 
number J > 1 of jurisdictions (or cities or MSAs) indexed by {1,..., }j J∈ ℑ ≡ . One way to 
interpret this setting is to assume that there is a representative jurisdiction and hence a 
representative planning board in each city or MSA. Households established in city j derive 
utility uj. Following the Random Utility Theory, which finds its origins in psychology 
(Thurstone 1927), we assume that uj is a random variable and we model the fraction fj of 
households that choose to live in city j as  
{ }Pr maxj j k kf u u∈ℑ= = .           (1) 
Specifically, the household-specific realization of uj, denoted as uj(h), has a common 
component Vj and an idiosyncratic, random households-specific component εj(h) with 
cumulative density G. These components add up as  
( ) ( ) , ( ) ~ i.i.d. ( )j j j ju h V h h Gε ε= + ⋅ .        (2) 
The common component Vj is deterministic and summarizes the costs and benefits from living 
in city j, expressed in monetary units; think about it as the indirect utility or real income. The 
idiosyncratic component ( )j hε  is random (Manski 1977, Anderson et al. 1992) and 
summarizes the idiosyncratic utility that h derives from consuming local amenities. 
Households are heterogeneous in their appreciation of these amenities: ceteris paribus, skiers 
prefer to live in Boulder and windsurfers in San Francisco. In order to get simple, explicit 
solutions, we assume that the ε’s are uniformly distributed over the interval [ / 2, / 2]σ σ− , 
where σ is proportional to the standard deviation of G. The mean and mode of G are zero, 
meaning that the average and median households are a-priory indifferent about where to live.4 
As a result of this and (2), the location choice probabilities in (1) are equivalent to  
                                                 
4
 Specifically, Var(ε) = σ2/12 and G(ε) = (2ε + σ)/(2σ). The deterministic case obtains at the limit σ = 0. The 
reader may be more familiar to modeling discrete location decisions with the multinomial logit model. We show 
in Appendix C (not intended for publication) that the equilibrium properties of the multinomial logit are 
qualitatively similar to the linear case. We choose to work with the linear model because we obtain simple, 
closed form solutions. There is a long tradition in the Political Economics literature to use linear discrete choice 
models to model voters’ decisions to cast their ballot for a candidate or another (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). 
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1 1 jj
V Vf
J σ
 − 
= + 
 
             (3) 
with fj = 0 or fj = 1 in an obvious manner if the RHS above falls outside the unit interval and 
/kkV V J∈ℑ≡∑  (throughout the paper, we use ‘upper bars’ to denote averages across cities). 
An implication of (3) is that cities that command a higher-than-average indirect utility Vj 
attract more households than the average city. The degree of household heterogeneity σ 
governs the sensitivity of fj with respect to the utility differential: heterogeneous populations 
are less sensitive to differences in the common components 1, ..., JV V .  
We assume that the common component Vj is a function of economic and non-economic 
variables pertaining to jurisdiction j: let 
j j j jV a w c t= + − − ,            (4) 
where aj is a measure of the observable quality of local amenities (converted in monetary 
units), w denotes the household’s income,  cj captures the monetary costs of living associated 
with j and tj is a local ‘regulatory tax’ levied on residents (more on this below). Household h’s 
global appreciation of city j’s amenities is thus equal to aj + εj(h). aj summarizes the attributes 
of local amenities that can be ranked across the average population (hence the term ‘quality’). 
To fix ideas, return to our example of comparing Boulder to San Francisco (j = B, SF). 
Ranking access to mountain slopes versus access to the ocean is clearly a mater of individual 
taste but most people prefer mild to very cold winter temperatures: the latter implies aSF > aB. 
Put differently, the distribution of aSF + εSF stochastically dominates the distribution of aB + εB 
and, keeping the economic attributes of VB and VSF in (4) equal, a larger fraction of 
households would then choose to live in San Francisco rather than in Boulder. 
In this paper, the land market outcomes play the central role, so we treat aj and w as 
parameters but we endogenize the cost of living as follows. Assume that city j is a linear 
monocentric city (Alonso 1964), in which the per-unit distance commuting cost is equal to τ  
and the unit cost of converting land into housing is constant and equal to mj. Then, if Hj 
households live in j, cj is equal to τHj + mj .5  Substituting this expression for cj in (4) yields:  
                                                 
5
 To see this, assume that all city dwellers consume one unit of land and that the central business district (CBD) 
is located at d = 0, so that a city of size Hj stretches out from 0 to Hj. Assume further that that the unit cost of 
converting farm land for housing consumption is equal to mj. Without loss of generality, we assume that the 
opportunity cost of land at the urban fringe is zero. Each city dweller commutes to the CBD at a constant per unit 
distance cost τ > 0. The city residential land market is at an equilibrium when the sum of commuting costs and 
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;j j j j j j jV H t a w mω τ ω= − − ≡ + − ,         (5) 
where ωj summarizes the ‘fundamental’ (parametric) determinants of welfare in city j. We say 
that a city characterized by a high ωj is a ‘desirable’ location ex ante (or that it is 
fundamentally desirable). The congestion cost τHj and regulatory cost tj are endogenous to the 
model. The former rises with city size; the latter is the outcome of the political economy game 
of section 3.2 below. Plugging (5) into (3) establishes that the fraction fj of households 
wishing to live in city j is decreasing in the regulatory tax it levies, decreasing in its level of 
congestion and increasing in the desirability of city j, which includes amenities and wages.  
Define the vectors 1[ ,..., ]'Jt t≡t  and 1[ ,..., ]'JH H≡H . Households treat t and τH as 
parameters. We define as a location equilibrium for H a situation in which, given the induced 
equilibrium values of (3) and (5), no household wishes to relocate to another jurisdiction. 
Formally, the actual fraction of households living in j, Hj/H, must be equal to fj.  Defining 
/H H J≡  and using (5) and (3), we may define the location equilibrium as  
( ) ( )
: 1 j j jj jj
t H t HH Hj f
H H
ω τ ω τ
σ
− − − − −
∀ ∈ ℑ = ⇔ = + .    (6) 
That is, the fraction of people living in j is increasing in the local well-being net of the 
regulatory tax and congestion costs and decreasing in the well-being net of regulatory tax and 
congestion costs of other cities. Since households directly consume one unit of land for 
housing purposes in the linear MCC model, the equilibrium Hj is also the equilibrium fraction 
of developed land in city j. We readily obtain the following: 
 
Proposition 1 (existence and uniqueness of the location equilibrium). Assume that the 
fraction of households that wish to live in city j is given by (3) and that the observable real 
income is given by (5). Then the location equilibrium defined in (6) exists and is unique. 
Proof . See Appendix A. 
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium concept. The downward-sloping schedule illustrates the 
fact that as cities get more populated they get more congested and thus less desirable, ceteris 
paribus. A higher ωj and/or a lower tj shift this schedule upwards. Thus, at equilibrium more 
desirable locations have more households. To see this formally, solve (6) explicitly for jH : 
                                                                                                                                                        
land rent are identical across city locations (a no arbitrage condition), thus the equilibrium bid rent schedule (net 
of conversion costs mj) is r(d) = τ (Hj – d). As a result, the cost of living is cj = τHj + mj, the aggregate land rent 
is equal to τH2/2 and ωj = aj + w - mj, as in (5).  
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( ) ( )
1 j jj
t tH
H H
ω ω
σ τ
− − −
= +
+
.           (7) 
Together with (5), (7) implies 
( )( ) ( )0 0 01 ,j j j HV t t H H
τ
κ ω κ ω τ κ
σ τ
= − − + − − ≡
+
.      (8) 
At the location equilibrium, households obtain a real income that is a weighted average of the 
local fundamental desirability net of regulatory taxes (the first term in the RHS above) and of 
the average of the same object (the second term), minus the average congestion cost. The 
weight of j-specific characteristics (relative to the average) increases in σ, our measure of the 
intensity of idiosyncratic household preferences for local specificities. Several aspects of (7) 
and (8) are noteworthy. First, cities that receive more households than the average H  either 
are fundamentally desirable, or have a low regulatory tax, or both, relative to the average city. 
Second, the effect of either variable on the location outcome is decreasing in the heterogeneity 
of households σ and in the overall crowding of cities Hτ . Third, all cities yield about the 
same welfare ex post: congestion and labor mobility between cities together ensure that in 
each city the marginal household is indifferent between staying put and living in its next best 
alternative. All infra-marginal households are strictly better off in the city of their choosing. 
To get a sense of this, consider the difference of the real incomes at the location equilibrium 
for two arbitrary cities j and k; using (8), we obtain 0(1 ) ( ) ( )j k j k j kV V t tκ ω ω − = − − − −  . At 
the limit 0σ →  (homogeneous population), all populated cities yield exactly the same 
welfare. Otherwise, for σ > 0 households do not enjoy exactly the same real wage everywhere 
at the spatial equilibrium because they are willing to forego some economic benefits to live in 
cities that offer the non-economic amenities that they enjoy the most.  
3.2. Planning boards choose regulation 
We assume that each jurisdiction j has a planning board that regulates the use of land. Land 
use restrictions can take many forms. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the main effect 
of such regulations is to increase the individual cost of living in the city of each household by 
tj. We interpret tj as a ‘regulatory tax’ (Glaeser et al. 2005a, b) and assume that it is 
capitalized into the price of developed land (Oates 1969, Palmon and Smith 1998). This 
capitalization effect captures in a parsimonious way the fact that land use regulations 
reallocate the local demand for land away from potential new developments to existing ones 
(keeping total demand for land Hj constant). In addition to this direct effect that benefits 
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owners of developed land at the expense of owners of undeveloped land, a higher regulatory 
tax in j decreases the desirability of j as per (5), which in turn reduces the equilibrium 
population size and equilibrium amount of developed land in city j as per (6); the former 
effect reduces the average land rent in the city.6 Thus, the overall indirect effect tends to hurt 
all landowners.  
Here, we depart from the standard literature by assuming that the planning board caters to the 
landowners’ interests. In the wake of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Dixit et al. (1997), 
we assume that the owners of developed land and the owners of undeveloped land (or land 
developers) form two competing lobbies that influence the planning board by way of lobbying 
contributions. Specifically, we assume that the planning board maximizes aggregate lobbying 
contributions j jC c
Λ
Λ
≡∑ , with Λ ∈ {owners of developed land, land developers}. This 
objective function conveys the idea that the planning board caters only to the interests of land 
stakeholders. We return to this bold assumption below. Note that land stakeholders include 
absentee landlords, local landlords, land developers, homeowners and even renters when rent 
controls are in place (de facto, rent controls act as way to share land rents between the owner 
and the renter).  
We also assume that each group offers a ‘menu’ of contributions to the planning board, 
contingent on the degree of regulation tj actually chosen so that ( )j j jc c tΛ Λ= . Many 
contribution schemes are possible (and thus many Nash equilibria exist), but Bernheim and 
Whinston (1986) show that the set of best responses of each lobby to any contribution scheme 
chosen by the other players includes a linear schedule of the form ( ) ( )j j j j jc t R t cΛ Λ Λ= − , where 
jR
Λ
 is the aggregate land rent pertaining to lobby Λ and jc
Λ
 is a constant determined at 
equilibrium. 7 Thus, the owners of developed land are offering a contribution schedule that is 
increasing in the degree of regulation; land developers’ contributions are decreasing in tj. The 
literal interpretation of this working hypothesis is that stakeholders bribe the planning boards 
                                                 
6
 This point is easily made: τ≡ =∫
2
0
( )d / 2jHj jTR r d t H , so the average land rent (defined as ARj ≡ TRj / Hj) is 
linearly increasing in Hj. It is not difficult to show that ARj is increasing in Hj also in nonlinear MCC models. 
7
 The timing of the contribution game is as follows. The lobbies (the ‘principals’) move first and simultaneously, 
the planning board (the ‘agent’) then chooses to accept the contributions or not and, contingent on accepting 
some, both, or no contributions, chooses tj. Since the principals move first, at equilibrium they choose jc
Λ
 so as 
to ensure that the agent accepts the contribution and enforces a regulation that is closer to the interests of lobby 
Λ. These linear contribution schedules also have the desirable property to produce the unique ‘coalition proof 
Nash equilibrium’ of the game. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) show how a model in which tj is set by cooperative 
Nash bargaining produces a similar policy outcome. 
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in order to sway its decisions. We may also understand the word ‘influence’ in a broader and 
more benign sense, such as pressure groups acting as experts and conveying useful 
information to the executives. By using legal contributions so as to buy access to executives 
(Austen-Smith 1995, Lohmann 1995), pressure groups provide credible information to 
legislators.8 As a result of these assumptions, the planning board maximizes total land rents 
plus the regulatory tax revenue: 
0
2
( ) ( ) d ( )
( ) ( ),
2
jH
j j j j
j j j
R H x x t H
H t H
τ
τ
 ≡ − + 
 = + 
∫t t t
t t
        (9) 
where Hj(t) is given by (7). Note that maximizing only the first component of Rj(t) above and 
ignoring strategic interactions among jurisdictions would lead planning boards to choose the 
first best policy by the Henry George theorem; this would be tj = 0 for all j since there is no 
market failure in the model. 
3.3. Subgame perfect equilibrium 
We solve for a Nash (subgame perfect) equilibrium (SPE henceforth) in regulatory taxes. 
Thus, j’s planning board chooses jt +∈ℜ  so as to maximize (9) subject to (7) taking the 
vector { }
0
\{ }k k jt ∈ℑ≡0-jt  as given (the superscript ‘0’ pertains to equilibrium values). Then the 
first order condition for this program may be written as 
( )
0 0
0 0 0 0( , ) ( , ) 0 , 0
j j j j
j j j j j j j j
j jt t t t
R t H H t H t t
t t
τ
= =
∂ ∂
= + + ≤ ≥
∂ ∂
0 0
-j -jt t ,  (10) 
with complementary slackness; 0jH  is the equilibrium city size, namely (7) evaluated at the 
Nash tax vector 0 01[ ,..., ]'Jt t≡0t  (also 0 01[ ,..., ]'JH H≡0H ).  The RHS consists of respectively 
the direct effect (keeping the population constant) and the indirect effect (allowing it to vary 
in response) of an increase in the specific regulatory tax. Let 
0
1 1J J H
J J H
τ
κ κ
σ τ
− −
≡ =
+
          (11) 
be a measure of the toughness of fiscal competition among jurisdictions: κ is increasing in the 
number of jurisdictions J and decreasing in the heterogeneity of households σ. Then, using (7) 
                                                 
8
 The non-partisan research group Centre for Responsive Politics (CPR) reports that the National Association of 
Realtors topped the CPR’s top-20 list of Political Action Committees contributing to federal candidates both in 
2005/6 and 2007/8. The National Association of Home Builders ranked 4th and 12th, respectively. 
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and (11) and assuming that the parameters of the model are such that the resulting 0jH ’s in 
(10) are all interior (precise conditions to follow in (16)), we may develop the first order 
condition (10) to get a non-negative equilibrium relationship between population size 0jH  and 
the regulation tax 0jt :  
0 01
j jt H
κ
τ
κ
−
= .            (12) 
Together, (7) and (12) compose a system of 2J equations in H0 and t0. Solving for individual 
regulatory taxes and populations yields:  
0 1 1 ( )12
j jt H
J
κ κ
τ ω ω
κ κ
− −
= + −
− −
,         (13)  
where the coefficient of ( )jω ω−  is strictly positive and smaller than unity, and 
0 1 ( )12
j jH H
J
κ
ω ω
τ κ
= + −
− −
,         (14) 
1,...,j J= . All the properties of the location equilibrium continue to hold at the SPE that (13) 
and (14) characterize. Four additional properties resulting from strategic interactions are 
noteworthy. First, the equilibrium regulatory tax increases in own desirability and decreases 
in the desirability of other cities; this effect is stronger, the higher the heterogeneity of 
households σ and the lower the congestion costs Hτ  are. The former cross-effect arises 
because a homogenous population is more responsive to any differences in amenities and 
taxes across locations; the latter arises because, when congestion costs are large, cross-city 
differences along other dimensions matter relatively less for households’ location choices. 
Second, places that are more desirable are more developed at equilibrium, despite being more 
regulated. That is, endogenous regulation does not change the ranking of cities according to 
their ωj; this follows by inspection of (13) and from κ < 1. Third, equilibrium tax rates are 
decreasing in the number of jurisdictions and increasing in the heterogeneity of workers, 
ceteris paribus. This can be interpreted as a pro-competitive effect: as σ rises, each 
jurisdiction perceives a lower land-demand elasticity from households. Finally, the average 
regulatory tax is increasing in the size of the population, keeping the number of cities 
constant: as existing cities become increasingly crowded and developed, the political balance 
tilts in favor of the owners of developed land. 
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The second derivative of Rj with respect to tj is invariant and negative for any t: 
2
2
(2 )0 ( )j
j
R
t
κ κ
τ
∂ −
> ⋅ = −
∂
.         (15) 
So we may write: 
Proposition 2 (existence and uniqueness of the SPE tax setting game). The Subgame 
perfect equilibrium characterized by (13) and (14) exists and is unique.  
Proof. See Appendix A. 
We can also formally establish the subgame perfect equilibrium properties of our model: 
Proposition 3 (properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium). Assume:  
 
2 1 / 2 1 /
: ( 1)j
J Jj H J Hκ κω τ ω ω τ
κ κ
− − − −∀ ∈ ℑ − < < + −  .   (16) 
Then the SPE characteristics of the model, summarized in (13) and (14), imply: 
(i)  Places that are fundamentally more desirable are more developed: 
0 0
j k j kH Hω ω> ⇒ > ; 
(ii) Places that are more developed are more regulated: 0 0 0 0j k j kH H t t> ⇒ > . 
Proof . See Appendix A. 
These are the properties that we test in section 4: (i) is the first stage of our TSLS instrumental 
variable (IV) approach, whereas (ii) is the second stage. The equilibrium properties of the 
model that we do not directly test include: 
Corollary 3.1 (further properties of the SPE). Assume that (16) holds. Then: 
(iii) Regulatory taxes are strictly positive for all j; 
(iv) The fundamental amenities of a jurisdiction are not fully capitalized into the 
regulatory tax: 0 0j k j j k kt tω ω ω ω> ⇒ − > − ; 
(v) Despite being more developed and more regulated, fundamentally more desirable 
places command a larger indirect utility: 0 0j k j kV Vω ω> ⇒ > . 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Our model can also shed light on the demographic origins of land use regulations: 
Corollary 3.2 (urbanization and land use regulations). The overall extent of regulation 
increases with the size of the urban population in the economy; furthermore, all cities are 
affected: 
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(vi) The average regulatory tax is increasing in H  and in H : 0 / 0t H∂ ∂ >  and 
0 / 0t H∂ ∂ > ; 
(vii) The variance of the regulatory tax is decreasing in the size of the urban 
population: 0Var( ) / 0t H∂ ∂ < .  
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The parameter restriction (16) requires the variation in the desirable fundamentals to be 
bounded above relative to household heterogeneity and congestion costs – not a very stringent 
condition – and in doing so ensures that the equilibrium population in any j is positive for the 
interior solution t0. We make this assumption for analytical convenience only. Relaxing it 
would require us to replace the strict inequalities in Proposition 3 by weak inequalities. 
 
3.4. Lobbying, voting and benevolent planning 
So far we have been assuming that planning boards only cater to ‘land-based interests’. A 
utilitarian urban planner would choose tj so as to maximise total welfare ( ) ( ) ( )j j j j j jH t V t R t+ ; 
one that seeks to please voters may maximise the welfare of the current residents 
( ) ( )j j j j jH V t R tα+ , where α is the share of land rents earned by local residents. A 
parsimonious way to model the behaviour of a planning board that responds simultaneously to 
social welfare, electoral considerations and lobbying pressure is to assume that it maximises 
the weighted sum ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j j j j j j jt b H t V t R t Ω ≡ +   ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )j j j j j jv H V t R t b v C tα + + + − −  , 
where parameters b and v respectively capture the ‘benevolence’ of the planning board and its 
responsiveness to the average voter’s well-being. Imposing b = v = 0 as in e.g. Krishna (1998) 
gives us Ω =( )j jt ( )j jC t  and yields clear cut results. 
Removing this assumption has no bearing on Proposition 2 (existence and uniqueness of the 
SPE) but it has the following implications. First, insofar as the regulatory tax benefits 
landowners (at least when they are low to start with) at the expense of other residents and 
voters, the equilibrium regulatory taxes tend to be lower than in (10) if b, v > 0. To see this, 
rewrite ( )j jtΩ  as [ ] { }( ) 1 (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j j j j j j j j j j jt v R t vH V t bH t V tαΩ = − − + +  and note that the 
term in the curly bracket, which is new with respect to (9), is decreasing in tj by (5) and (7). 
Then 0 / 0jt b∂ ∂ <  and 0 / 0jt v∂ ∂ <  follow by the second order condition (15) and the envelope 
theorem. Second, if b and v are small enough (i.e. if (2 ) 1b v α+ − <  holds) then the 
qualitative results summarized in Proposition 3 carry through unaltered. Otherwise, if the 
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planning board cares about social welfare or the voters’ well being enough, then it can be 
shown that cities that are more developed are less regulated at equilibrium. The implications 
of our theory and those of two important alternative hypotheses are thus mutually exclusive.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
The main purpose of our empirical analysis is to explore the causal effect of physical 
residential development on regulatory restrictiveness at the MSA-level. It follows from the 
location equilibrium of our theory (7) and from the very purpose of regulation that residential 
development is endogenous to the regulatory environment. Therefore, we need an exogenous 
source of variation of urban development in order to identify its effect on regulation. Our 
theory readily suggests two sets of instruments: natural amenities and topography: desirable 
cities (those with a high aj) and MSAs that contain a lot of plains (and hence have a low 
average conversion cost mj) are more developed at equilibrium by (7). In our main empirical 
analysis we use land use data from 1992 to explore the causal effect of the share developed 
residential land on regulatory restrictiveness around 2005.  
4.1. Description of data 
Our data is derived from various sources and geographical levels of aggregation. We match 
all data to the MSA level using GIS. Table 1 provides summary statistics for all variables. The 
top panel pertains to our main sample period (turn of 21st century); the bottom panel reports 
the variables that belong to the earlier sample (around 1980). 
The more recent of our two land use datasets, the National Land Cover Data 1992 (NLCD 
92), is derived from satellite images. The earlier dataset, the Land Use and Land Cover 
GIRAS Spatial Data, comes from aerial photos taken around 1976. Both datasets cover the 
surface areas of all MSAs in our sample.9 There is a considerable difference in map resolution 
and in land use definitions between 1976 and 1992, making direct comparisons of the data 
difficult. The two datasets are described in more detail in Burchfield et al. (2006). 
We define the share developed land in an MSA (henceforth SDL) as 
 
   
   
developed residential land areaSDL
developable residential land area
= ,       (17) 
                                                 
9
 A special case is the MSA of Washington, DC. While we have data for the surface area of the MSA outside the 
District of Columbia, we do not have any information for the District itself. Hence we imputed SDL by assuming 
that land uses within the District are similar to that at the boundaries. Since the District covers only about 1 
percent of the MSA’s surface area, this adjustment increases the SDL measure for the MSA by only about half a 
percentage point. None of our results changes notably if we assume that the District is either not at all or fully 
developed nor if we drop the observation altogether.  
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where the ‘developable residential land area’ is the total land area minus the surface area that 
is covered by industrial land or ‘non-developable’ land uses (i.e., soil that does not 
sufficiently support permanent structures and/or is extremely costly to develop).10 SDL is our 
proxy for Hj in the model and captures the political influence of owners of developed land 
relative to the influence of owners of undeveloped land. 
The homeownership rates (HOR henceforth) for 1980 and 1990 are extracted from the 
Neighborhood Community Database (NCDB). We compute population densities in the 
developed residential area (POPD) using NCDB and NLCD data. (POPD and HOR 
respectively control for the alternative welfare economics and homevoter hypotheses.) 
We use the two regulatory indices as the counterpart in the data to the regulatory tax tj in the 
model. Each of these indices is derived from a different source and pertains to a different time 
period. WRLURI is a measure of differences in the local land use regulatory climate across 
more than 2600 communities across the US based on a 2005 survey and a separate study of 
state executive, legislative, and court activities. It is arguably the most comprehensive survey 
to date. See Gyourko et al. (2008) for details on the compilation. Saiz (2008) reports WRLURI 
values for 95 MSAs (our sample consists of 93 MSAs; we loose two observations for lack of 
data on 1880 population density). A WRLURI value of 1 implies that the measure is one 
standard deviation above the national mean. The SAKS measure was created by Saks (2008) 
as a ‘comprehensive index of housing supply regulation’ by using the simple average of six 
independent surveys conducted during the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s (see Saks 
2008 for a description of the underlying surveys and the method of index construction). Saks 
reports regulatory index values for 83 MSAs. We loose two observations for lack of land use 
data and for lack of information on historic density.11 Similar to the WRLURI, the SAKS index 
is scaled to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
There is considerable variation in the degree of land use regulation across US MSAs. 
Gyourko et al. (2008) suggest that there is more variation across than within MSAs. Other 
empirically motivated reasons also lead us to choose to run our regressions at the MSA level. 
In many MSAs only few municipalities responded to the surveys that are the foundation of 
                                                 
10
 These land uses include barren, water, ice, wetlands, and shrubland (1992 classifications) and ‘undefined’, 
barren, water, ice, wetlands, shrub/brush land, dry salt flats, beaches, sandy areas, bare exposed rock, strip 
mines, all categories of tundra except herbaceous tundra (1976 classifications). We experimented classifying all 
tundra as ‘non-developable’ or ‘developable’. Results are virtually unchanged in all the specifications to follow.  
11
 Glaeser et al. (2005a) estimate a regulatory tax for 21 MSAs using 1998 data. The interested reader may find 
this regulatory tax, WRLURI, SAKS and SDL values for these cities in Table U1 (not for publication). We also 
report pair-wise correlations and rank correlations of these variables as well as of the homeownership rates. 
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the WRLURI and SAKS measures and many potentially important controls are available at the 
MSA- or state-level only. See also Gyourko et al. (2008) and Saiz (2008) on the merits of 
using MSA aggregates in this context. Our decision to use aggregate indices – rather than 
various measures of different types of land use regulation – allows us to capture the overall 
regulatory environment, while avoiding the loss of statistical clarity associated with trying to 
look at the effects of various types of regulations simultaneously (Glaeser and Ward 2009). 
Our amenity measures and the region dummies are derived from the Environmental Systems 
Research Institute’s (ESRI) Census 2000 MSA-level shape file. The sources for our other 
(excluded) instruments and controls are listed in the note to Table 1.   
4.2. Baseline empirical specification and results using OLS 
Our objective in this section is to test the predictions of our model as directly as possible. The 
key prediction, stated in Proposition 3 (ii), follows from (10): places that are more developed 
are more regulated, i.e. 0 0/ 0j jt H∂ ∂ > . The homevoter hypothesis argues that places with a 
higher homeownership rate should be more regulated. The welfare economics view suggests 
that regulation corrects for market failures in the urban economy (e.g. ‘externality zoning’). 
We use population density as a proxy for the intensity of these market failures. The 
motivation for this is that all urban economic theories predict that externalities that are 
conductive to agglomeration economies and urban costs are sensitive to distance: denser 
places generate more non-market interactions and pecuniary externalities, both conductive to 
urban growth (e.g. knowledge spillovers, labor market matching) and to urban costs (e.g. 
noise). These competing explanations can be tested by estimating the following model: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4j j j jWRLURI POPD controlsβ β β β β ε= + + + + +j jSDL HOR ,  (18) 
where WRLURI is our measure for the restrictiveness of regulation and εj is the error term 
with the standard assumed properties. The priors are β1 > 0 by the ‘influential landowner’ 
hypothesis, β2 < 0 by Fischel’s ‘homevoter’ hypothesis and β3 > 0 by the welfare economics 
hypothesis. The variables in bold are potentially endogenously determined. Putting this issue 
aside, we start by running (18) by OLS. The controls include share democratic votes, namely, 
the state share of votes that went for the Democratic candidate in the 1988 and the 1992 
presidential elections (allowing for the fact that regulatory restrictiveness may be driven by 
political ideology), average household wage (to control for the possibility that the findings are 
driven by income sorting), and regional dummies (to capture all other region-specific 
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unobservable characteristics). The estimation results are reported in column (1) of Table 2.12 
The adjusted R2 of 0.377 is reasonably high. Among the coefficients of interest, only β1 has 
the expected sign and is statistically significant. This preliminary finding is encouraging for 
our influential landowner hypothesis. Turning attention to the controls, we see that MSAs in 
Democrat-leaning states are more regulated. Our interpretation is that liberal voters (in North 
American parlance) are ideologically more sympathetic to regulation than conservative 
voters.13 This result is robust to adding an interaction term between share democratic votes 
and average income; the coefficient is insignificant, suggesting that blue collar and white 
collar Democrats do not hold significantly different views on regulations.14  Region dummies 
reveal that broad geographic patterns emerge, with the West being the most regulated region 
and the Midwest (the omitted category) the least regulated.  
4.3. Identification strategy and results for IV-specifications 
One important caveat with the OLS estimates of (18) reported in Table 2 (column 1) is that at 
least two of the explanatory variables are likely endogenously determined, causing the 
estimates to be biased. Among possible sources of endogeneity, it directly follows from our 
theory that regulation works as an impediment to development by (7). This implies that the 
estimation of β1 in (18) is biased downwards. We address this issue by instrumenting for SDL. 
We rely on the model to find credible sources of exogenous variations in SDL that are not 
directly correlated with our regulatory measure WRLURI. Our identifying assumption for the 
SDL variable is that places endowed with desirable amenities and located on plains are 
developed earlier, attract more residents over time and, as a result, are more developed in our 
cross-section of MSAs, but that these characteristics are not directly related to regulatory 
restrictiveness. These predictions directly follow from Proposition 3 (i). Its first component is 
a demand factor: ceteris paribus, people prefer to live in nice places. We thus use a dummy 
variable that equals one if the MSA has a major border with a coastline and average 
temperatures in January as instruments for SDL. January temperatures should not have a 
direct and systematic influence on a broad index of residential land use regulations. However, 
                                                 
12
 Throughout the paper the standard errors are clustered by state because the share of democratic votes is state-
specific.  
13
 To ensure that our results may not be spurious, we include one explanatory variable at a time. We find that the 
OLS coefficient of SDL varies from 1.34 when only SDL and HOR are included to around 2 when we include 
the share Democrat votes variable. Thus, in addition to being an important explanation on its own, ideology is 
helpful in identifying the role of SDL. See Table U2 (not intended for publication) for details. 
14
 See Table U7 (not intended for publication), Columns (1) to (3) for details. 
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the reader may worry that valuable ocean coasts require protection in the form of regulation. 
In practice, three properties of the WRLURI measure suggest that border with coast is a valid 
instrument. First, the WRLURI measure does not include attitudes towards regulation of 
coastal areas. Second, the majority of municipalities responding to the survey do not have 
access to the coast; this is true even for municipalities that belong to MSAs with access to the 
coast. Finally, federal regulations that may protect the coast are excluded from WRLURI by 
construction.  
The second component of Proposition 3(ii) is a supply factor: it is simpler and cheaper to 
convert open land into developed land in plains. Hence, we use share of plains as an 
instrument for SDL. The way we define SDL in (17) is crucial for this to be part of a valid 
identification strategy. Indeed, some regulations may be designed purposely to protect some 
local amenities; Saiz (2008) shows how land use regulations correlate with the fraction of 
undeveloped land in an MSA. These plots on which it is not practically feasible to build are 
excluded from both the numerator and the denominator of (17). 
We also use historical population density from 1880 as an additional instrument for SDL. 
This is consistent with a dynamic interpretation of our model: desirable locations and plains 
attracted people early and were developed first, before land use regulations became part of 
the urban political life. This variable captures all the unobserved and time-invariant amenity 
and cost factors not already included in our set of instruments that lead people to settle in a 
specific place. It also captures historic amenity and cost factors that were important a long 
time ago and which started a dynamic development process of cities. They may no longer be 
important today, yet remain relevant because of inertia, durable housing, or the generation of 
agglomeration forces.  
These considerations lead us to run the following first stage regression by OLS:  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 1 2 3
4 5
 
 ,
α α α α
α α ξ
= + + +
+ + +
j j j j
j j j
SDL coast temperature share plains
historical density controls
    (19) 
where ξj is the error term. Our priors are α1 ,α2 , α3 , α4 > 0. The results are reported in 
column (2) of Table 2. All coefficients have the expected sign and are significant beyond the 
five percent level with the exception of α3: share of plains is only weakly correlated with 
SDL. Nevertheless, the four instruments are jointly significant. Households obviously value 
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access to the seafront and mild winter temperatures. The quantitative effects are strong: 15 
granting a border with coast to a hitherto landlocked MSA increases its share of developed 
land by 65.2% (+8.1 percentage points); an extra one standard deviation in average January 
temperature and historical density are respectively associated with a 52.7% (+6.5 percentage 
points) and a 44.3% (+5.5 percentage points) increase in SDL. As to our set of controls, MSAs 
in the South have the lowest share of developed land and MSAs that command a high 
household average wage are more developed, consistent with the logic of our model of 
household location. These effects are statistically significant at the one percent level. The 
adjusted R2 is reasonably high with 0.59.  The second stage regression results of (18) with 
SDL being treated as the unique endogenous variable are reported in column (5) of Table 2. 
The TSLS coefficient of SDL is positive and significant at the five percent level. It is larger 
than the OLS coefficient of SDL, confirming the presence of a downward bias. We provide 
more direct evidence about this feedback mechanism in Section 6. These findings provide 
both direct and indirect evidence consistent with our theory. The coefficients on the 
homeownership rate (HOR) and contemporaneous population density (POPD) remain 
insignificant. The findings that Democrat-leaning MSAs and those in the West prefer above 
average levels of regulation are very similar for our OLS and TSLS specifications.  
We conclude from these findings that the effect of SDL on regulation is quite well identified. 
The effect is also quantitatively meaningful. To fix ideas, compare Kansas City to San 
Francisco. The former has no access to coast, average January temperatures are 28.5°F, its 
share of developable land classified as plains is 63% and its historical population density is 
52.3 people per km2. San Francisco has a border with the Pacific Ocean, January temperatures 
average 48.2°F, it has no county that is classified as a plain and its population density in 1880 
was 239.6 people per km2. The implied difference in SDL is 16.3 percentage points (a full 1.6 
standard deviations). This, in turn, implies a 1.05 standard deviation difference of WRLURI 
between the two MSAs. Kansas City is the 9th least regulated city in our sample. Granting it 
with San Francisco’s amenities and topography alone hypothetically makes it the 41st most 
regulated city (SF is the 16th most regulated city).  
The estimation of β2 in (18) may also be biased if there are omitted variables that are 
correlated with HOR or if land use regulations systematically influence the incentive to own 
one’s home. We use the MSA’s share of households that consist of married couples without 
                                                 
15
 We report quantitative effects for all our main specifications in Table U8 (not intended for publication). 
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children as a source of exogenous variation of HOR in order to improve the identification of 
its effect on WRLURI. Married couples without children tend to have higher and more stable 
household incomes and are able to accumulate greater wealth over time compared to married 
couples with children. This makes them more likely to overcome liquidity and down-payment 
constraints and thus eases attaining homeownership. Moreover, married couples tend to be in 
more stable relationships compared to their unmarried counterparts, implying a longer 
expected duration in their property and, consequently, greater incentives to own rather than 
rent. By contrast, we do not expect the share of households that consists of married couples 
without children to help us identify the SDL. Our empirical results reported in column (3) of 
Table 2 are consistent with this prior; by contrast, the patterns of column (2) are unchanged or 
even reinforced. Column (4) reports OLS estimates of the effect of the share households with 
married couples and no children and the various controls on the homeownership rate. As 
predicted, the former is positive and highly statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Historical population density also helps us to identify the HOR; this finding makes sense 
because denser places have taller buildings and renting (rather than owning) is more efficient 
in multi-unit buildings. The adjusted R2 of 0.658 is quite high. The results contained in 
columns (2) to (4) thus establish that our proposed instruments for SDL and HOR fulfill the 
necessary condition for being valid instruments. 
The estimation of (18) with both SDL and HOR instrumented for are reported in Table 2, 
columns (6) to (8) (we additionally instrument for POPD in Section 5.2). Independent of 
whether we use the TSLS estimator (column 6), the Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML) estimator (column 7) or the Jackknife (JIVE) estimator (column 8) we 
find that the coefficient of SDL is positive, statistically significant and larger than the OLS 
coefficient of column (1). These results confirm the presence of a downward bias in the OLS 
specification and reinforce our influential landowner hypothesis. We run the model using 
LIML because it is approximately median unbiased for over-identified models (we have five 
instruments and two endogenous explanatory variables) and produces a smaller bias than 
TSLS in finite samples. Since its asymptotic properties are the same as those of the TSLS 
estimator, we hope to find similar coefficients in the TSLS and LIML regressions as a rule of 
thumb (Angrist and Pischke 2009). We report the results of the regression using the JIVE 
estimator for further reference only, so we postpone further discussion of this estimation 
technique. The stability of the magnitude of the estimated β1 across columns (6) to (8) 
increases further our confidence in the robustness of our findings and strengthens our IV 
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strategy. We also carry out the usual battery of tests that assess the validity of the instrumental 
variables, including over-identification tests as well as Hansen-J statistics and Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM statistics, and none of these tests indicates a problem at the usual confidence 
levels. Therefore, we do not report these results in order to save space. The last line of Table 2 
reports Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics, a test for weak instruments in the presence of 
robust (clustered) standard errors. The test statistic in column (5) indicates with 95 percent 
confidence that the maximum TSLS size is just about 15%, implying that our instruments 
taken together are reasonably strong (Stock and Yogo 2005; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). The 
statistic in column (6) is much lower, raising concerns that our instruments might be weak in 
this case; this provides one additional motivation for replicating the analysis using LIML (the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic is the same but the critical values are lower than for 
TSLS). The result in this case is extremely strong: the reported statistic in column (7) is well 
above the critical value for a maximum LIML size of 10%. This vindicates our identification 
strategy. 
To summarize, the robust results so far are strongly supportive of various aspects of the 
influential landowner hypothesis. The theoretical predictions of Proposition 3(i) and (ii) are 
vindicated; the effect of regulation on SDL introduces a downward bias.  
5. Further specifications and alternative dataset 
We explore the sensitivity of our results to the set of instruments we include (Table 3), the set 
of endogenous variables that we instrument for and the estimator we use (Table 4), the proxy 
we use for the relative influence of owners of developed land (Table 5) and the dataset and 
time period we use (Table 6). 
5.1. Instruments  
In our baseline specification we instrument for SDL and HOR using five instruments. We 
replicate our baseline results in column (1) of Table 3 for convenience. The remaining 
columns in Table 3 report results for reduced sets of instruments. Panel A reports the first 
stage estimated coefficients of our instruments (the dependant variable is SDL) and Panels B 
and C respectively report the second stage TSLS and LIML coefficients of the share 
developed land, the homeownership rate and the population density in 1990. In columns (2) to 
(5), we replicate these estimations dropping one instrument at a time. In columns (6) to (11), 
we drop two instruments at a time. Inspection of the coefficients in Panel A reveals that 
border with coast, average temperatures in January and historical density are particularly 
helpful in our quest to identify the effect of SDL on WRLURI: they consistently have the 
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expected sign, their magnitude is stable, and they are statistically significant at the one percent 
level (except average temperatures in January that sometimes ventures in the five percent 
zone). The effect of share plains on SDL is also positive and statistically significant 
throughout, though ‘only’ at the five or ten percent level. Finally, the share of married 
couples without children (our excluded instrument for HOR) is uncorrelated to SDL 
throughout, as in our baseline specification. 
Turning to Panels B and C of Table 3, the striking result is that the effect of SDL on WRLURI 
is positive and statistically significant in nine cases out of ten: dropping both border with 
coast and share plains creates the only combination of instruments that yields a coefficient on 
SDL that is – albeit positive – not quite significant at the 10 percent level. Dropping either 
alone, however, or in combination of any other instrument, does identify the effect of SDL on 
WRLURI. The coefficients on HOR are stable but not statistically larger than zero (with one 
borderline exception). The coefficients on POPD remain statistically insignificant throughout. 
Ideology and regional dummies (not reported) remain stable and statistically significant. 
The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics are in line with those of Table 2: the TSLS statistics 
fluctuate around the critical values of maximum TSLS sizes of 15% to 20%; the LIML 
statistics are all well above the critical value for a maximum LIML size of 10%.  
5.2. Endogenous Population Density (POPD)  
In Table 4, we endogenize the POPD variable in addition to SDL and HOR. Various types of 
land use controls – including minimum lot size restrictions – differentially affect the 
population density, suggesting reversed causation and biased estimates. We expect two of our 
excluded instruments to be useful for identifying POPD. The first of these instruments is the 
share of plains in an MSA. The identifying assumption is that sprawl is easier in particularly 
flat areas, where it is particularly easy to build, leading us to expect a negative coefficient for 
share of plains when the dependant variable is POPD (in contrast to the SDL variable). The 
second instrument is historical MSA-level population density from 1880. We expect the 
MSAs that were densely populated in the 19th century (prior to the evolution of land use 
regulation in the United States) to have a densely populated developable area today. Column 
(3) shows that historical population density and share of plains both have the expected sign 
and are statistically significant. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report results for the first 
stages of the variables SDL and HOR, respectively. The results are similar to the 
corresponding ones in Table 2 (columns 3 and 4).  
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The results of the second-stage using alternative estimators (TSLS, LIML, and JIVE), 
reported in columns (4) to (6), are equally supportive. Instrumenting simultaneously for SDL, 
HOR, and POPD systematically increases the point estimate of the second stage coefficient of 
SDL relative to the specifications with one or two instrumented variables in Table 2, columns 
(6) to (8). These coefficients also remain statistically significant at the same confidence levels 
as their Table 2 counterparts. The quantitative effect of SDL on WRLURI is also enlarged: a 
one standard deviation increase in SDL raises WRLURI by more than one third of a standard 
deviation; this is equivalent to a boost in the regulatory rate league table from the median 
(rank 47) to the top third. By contrast, the second stage coefficients of HOR and POPD 
remain statistically insignificant in all three specifications reported in columns (4) to (6).  
While we can calculate and report Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics for our TSLS and 
LIML specifications to assess whether our instruments are jointly ‘weak’, critical values are 
not available from Stock and Yogo (2005) for specifications with more than two endogenous 
variables. To correct for the possible presence of weak instruments, we therefore also re-
estimate (18) using a JIVE estimator (Angrist, Imbens and Krueger 1999). JIVE gets round 
the correlation between stage-one and stage-two errors by predicting the value of SDL of 
MSA j by running the first stage for j on all MSAs but j and repeating the procedure for all 93 
cities in the sample (thus, the procedure has in a sense as many first stages as observations). 
As a result, this IV estimator bias is smaller than the TSLS bias but the standard errors are 
larger. The regression results of column (6) are consistent with these priors. The estimated 
coefficient for SDL using JIVE is of comparable magnitude to those of TSLS and LIML. This 
suggests that even if the instruments used to identify the endogenous variables were jointly 
weak the resulting bias would be small.  
The estimated coefficients on political ideology (share democratic votes) and the region 
dummies are stable and remain statistically significant.  
5.3. MSA boundaries and representative places 
To test the robustness of our results to the MSA definition, we redefine SDL so as to include 
only the land cover within a 20km radius from the centre of each MSA. It turns out that ‘more 
developed’ MSAs are more developed at any radius from the center than ‘less developed’ 
MSAs (see also Burchfield et al. 2006 on this), which leads us to expect our main results to be 
robust to this change. We also redefine SDL in various ways that include industrial land or 
exclude parks, or both. Finally, to immunize our results to the role of outlier places, we 
attribute to the MSA the SDL of its average or median place. We report the results of various 
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combinations of these robustness checks in Table 5, columns (1) to (9). Column (10) 
replicates the whole analysis using the aggregate property value per m2 of developable land 
as the proxy variable for the relative influence of owners of developed land relative to that of 
owners of undeveloped land. This is the alternative, indirect measure that we use in Figure 1 
(Panel c). Panels A, B and C respectively report the first stage, second stage TSLS and second 
stage LIML results. We instrument for both SDL and HOR as in our baseline specification 
throughout; the results ought thus to be gauged against those of Table 2, columns (6) and (7). 
The results are again strongly in line with our baseline specification. The major access to 
coast and historical population density variables are positive and highly statistically 
significant in all specifications of Panel A. Aggregate property values are strongly and 
positively correlated with border with coast and average January temperatures, which is 
consistent with the finding that desirable amenities are at least partly capitalized into land 
prices (Gyourko et al. 2006). The second-stage results reported in Table 5 are equally bold. In 
all 18 reported specifications – using quite different definitions for SDL and two different 
estimation techniques – we find that SDL has a positive and statistically highly significant 
causal impact on WRLURI. The coefficient on aggregate property value in column (10) is 
also statistically positive at the ten percent level in both panels. By contrast, the sign of the 
coefficient on HOR is statistically insignificant in over half of the specifications. 
Reassuringly, the coefficients on all variables are quite stable across specifications. We also 
replicate all the regressions in Table 5 endogenizing simultaneously for SDL, HOR and 
POPD. Our results come out even stronger: the point estimate of the coefficient of SDL rises 
in all twenty cases and it is statistically significant at the one percent level throughout Panel B 
and never below the five percent level throughout Panel C.16 
5.4. The 1970/1980 sample 
As an ‘out-of-sample’ check we apply our two-stage methodology to a different dataset and 
time period. The dependent variable of interest is the SAKS index of residential land use 
regulations, pertaining to the late 1970s/early 1980s. Our measure for SDL is derived from 
aerial photos taken in the mid 1970s. 
We regress (18) with SAKS replacing WRLURI. Table 6 (Panel A) reports the results. Turn to 
columns (1) to (3) for the first stage regressions. Interestingly, at that time land development 
seemed to be well explained by average January temperature and historical population 
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 For details, see Table U3 (not intended for publication). 
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density, whereas border with coast and share plains play a lesser role than in the 1992 data. 
The second stage regressions, reported in columns (4) to (7), provide again strong support for 
our influential landowner hypothesis. The estimated coefficient of SDL is stable across 
specifications (one or two endogenous variables) and estimators (TSLS and LIML). It is also 
statistically significant at the one percent level and quantitatively strong: one extra standard 
deviation in SDL raises SAKS by over two thirds of a standard deviation; this is equivalent to 
a boost in the regulatory rate league table from the median (rank 41) to the top quarter. This 
earlier data also rejects the homevoter hypothesis and the implications of the welfare 
economics view. Political ideology, as measured by the share democratic votes in the two 
preceding presidential elections, is seemingly unrelated to regulatory restrictiveness in the late 
1970s and 1980s. Finally, in line with our first stage findings, the Kleibergen-Paap statistics 
suggest that our instruments are weaker than in the baseline case. We thus re-run our 
regressions with the reduced set of statistically significant excluded instruments: average 
January temperature and historical population density.17 The estimated coefficients are stable 
and those on SDL remain significant at the one percent level; the Kleibergen-Paap statistic 
also increases, as expected. In short, with the exception of the role of ideology, the patterns 
that we have uncovered for the 1990/2000 data were already present in the 1970/1980 data. 
5.5. Additional robustness checks  
We performed a variety of additional robustness checks. Since they reinforce our main results 
with only minor qualifications, we report them only briefly; also, we include the associated 
tables (not intended for publication) in this version of the paper for the sake of completeness. 
The contemporaneous sample of cities has 93 MSAs and the one pertaining to the late 1970s 
has 81. Yet, only 63 MSAs are included in both samples. In Table U5, we replicate the simple 
OLS as well as the first stage and second stage TSLS and LIML results for both 
contemporaneous regulation (as measured by WRLURI) in Panel A and older regulation (as 
measured by SAKS) in Panel B. The striking result is that the key coefficients of the 
influential landowner hypothesis remain precisely estimated and of the correct sign, despite 
the sample size being quite small. This caveat bites only in producing relatively weak 
Kleibergen-Paap statistics. The alternative explanations (homevoter hypothesis and welfare 
economics view) keep finding weak support at best in the combined sample. 
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NYC and many Californian cities have rent controls. As these controls might affect the nature 
of the political economy game, we replicate our analysis excluding either or both sets of 
cities. Table U6 reports the first stage results (Panel A) and the OLS and second stage TSLS 
and LIML results (Panel B). It is readily verified that the influential landowner hypothesis 
finds strong and stable support throughout. The only qualification with our main findings is 
that the homevoter hypothesis now finds support in the TSLS and LIML specifications as 
well.  
Finally, we drop the explanatory variable share of democratic votes and re-run our central 
specification one more time. The results are reported in Table U7, columns (4) to (7). The 
estimated coefficients on SDL drop somewhat but remain statistically significant. Political 
ideology clearly reinforces the identification of the influential landowner hypothesis in 
addition to playing an important role on its own in explaining land use regulation patterns. 
6. Land use regulations and the supply of housing 
The workings of the economic mechanism central to our influential landowner hypothesis 
rests partly on the assumption that land use regulations increase the cost of further 
developments as per e.g. (7). To check whether this is a feature of the regulatory index in our 
data, we run the following with OLS:  
 γ γ γ ζ
−
= + + +
, 0 1 , 2 , 1 ,( ) ( )H e Hj t j t j t j tg regulation g       (20) 
where 
,
H
j tg  is the growth rate of the housing stock in MSA j between time period t and  t+1 (in 
number of housing units), 
, 1
H
j tg −  is the equivalent growth rate between time period t-1 and t, γ0 
is the common trend, 
,
e
j tregulation  is the estimated level of regulatory restrictiveness in MSA 
j at time t, and ζj,t is the error term. We include , 1Hj tg −  to control for persistence in local 
housing markets. Our theoretical prior leads us to expect γ1 < 0 by a dynamic version of (7). 
To reduce the importance of high frequency shocks, and for data availability reasons, we 
compute the growth rates over 10-year time periods. By this token, we will have to wait until 
2020 to assess the effect of WRLURI on the ten-year growth of the housing stock. However, 
we can readily assess the effect of the (estimated) SAKS measure. 
We back out the fitted values for 
, ,
e e
j t j tregulation SAKS=  from the estimations of Table 6, 
Panel A. We report the regression results for (20) in Panel B. Because the regulatory index 
measures are estimated values, we report bootstrapped (and robust) standard errors using 
1,000 replications. They are also in line with our priors: in all four specifications the predicted 
 29 
regulatory tax has a negative and statistically highly significant effect on the growth rate in 
housing supply in the 1990s.18 An increase of the predicted SAKS index by one standard 
deviation reduces the growth rate of housing supply by 2.8 percentage points. This is 
equivalent to a drop in the growth rate league table from rank 41 to 54. Overall, our results in 
Table 6 imply that while more desirable MSAs grew more quickly in the past when little land 
was developed and regulation was lax, their growth rate has later slowed down significantly 
compared with less desirable MSAs. We attribute this effect to tighter land use controls. To fit 
the spirit of our linear model more closely, we also run (20) in first differences (results not 
reported), with no effect on the qualitative results that we report here. 
7. Concluding remarks 
Land use regulations vary tremendously in shape and scope across space and have become 
more widespread and stringent over time. They impose an enormous cost on households. 
Understanding the effects and causes of these regulations is thus of primary economic policy 
importance. Yet, perhaps because a large part of these costs are indirect, this area of research 
remains relatively under-explored. 
Our study contributes to the understanding of political economics considerations that shape 
land use restrictions. We focus exclusively on residential land use by the nature of the 
regulatory data available. In practice, zoning also separates incompatible land uses and the 
business districts from residential areas. With this caveat in mind, our results suggest that the 
tightness of residential land use regulations is unrelated to welfare economics considerations. 
They instead point to land based interests. Thus, the outcome is suboptimal. Crossing our 
results with those of Glaeser et al. (2005a, b), it appears that regulation in highly developed 
places like Manhattan and San Francisco may be grossly over-restrictive. By the same token, 
metro areas like Kansas City may be too little regulated. Land use regulations are multi-
dimensional and more work is needed to understand which policies in particular are the most 
harmful – and which ones may have to be expanded.  
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set of excluded instruments. See Panel B in Table U4 (not intended for publication). 
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Summary Statistics and Regression Tables 
Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Wharton regulatory index (WRLURI), 2005 a) 93 0.117 0.702 -1.25 2.07 
Homeownership rate, 1990 b) 93 0.628 0.070 0.325 0.739 
Developed residential land as % of developable non-industrial land 
(“share developed residential”), 1992 c) 
93 0.124 0.122 0.0119 0.761 
Alternative measures for robustness checks      
Developed land as % of developable land (“share developed”), 
1992 c) 
93 0.154 0.134 0.0198 0.847 
Share developed, 20km radius, 1992 c) 93 0.363 0.208 0.0580 1 
Share developed residential, 20km radius, 1992 c) 93 0.309 0.204 0.0436 1 
Share developed, excluding parks, 1992 c) 93 0.149 0.139 0.0204 1 
Share developed residential, excluding parks, 1992 c) 93 0.121 0.132 0.0124 1 
Share developed of average place, 1992 c) 93 0.462 0.164 0.0976 1 
Share developed residential of average place, 1992 c) 93 0.419 0.168 0.0822 1 
Share developed of median place, 1992 c) 93 0.463 0.188 0.0947 1 
Share developed residential of median place, 1992 c) 93 0.414 0.190 0.0793 1 
 Aggregate property value per m2 of developable land, 1990 b) 93 17.9 35.4 1.3 237.5 
Population density in developed residential area (per m2), 1990 d) 93 0.00264 0.00125 0.00116 0.0107 
%Democratic votes in state, av. presidential elections 1988/92 e) 93 48.8 4.9 34.4 58.8 
Average household wage, 1990 b) 93 30.0 5.2 17.0 46.5 
Region = Midwest (omitted) f) 93 0.215 0.413 0 1 
Region = North East f) 93 0.183 0.389 0 1 
Region = South f) 93 0.376 0.487 0 1 
Region = West f) 93 0.226 0.420 0 1 
Metro area has major border with coast f) 93 0.247 0.434 0 1 
Average temperature in January, measured between 1941-1970 g) 93 38.2 12.5 11.8 67.2 
Share land in topography classification that consists of plains g) 93 0.546 0.432 0 1 
Population density in metro area (per m2), 1880 i), x 10-6 93 125.5 490.3 0.1 4698.6 
% Households with married couples and no children, 1990 b) 93 0.291 0.028 0.236 0.427 
Saks-index of housing supply regulation (SAKS), late 1970s/80s  h) 81 0.00544 0.997 -2.399 2.211 
Homeownership rate, 1980 b)  81 0.636 0.0739 0.278 0.764 
Developed residential land as % of developable land, 1976 c) 81 0.118 0.104 0.0119 0.501 
Population density in the developed area (per m2), 1980 d) 81 0.00231 0.00113 0.000254 0.00896 
%Democratic votes in state, av. presidential elections 1972/76 e) 81 43.8 3.1 31.6 51.9 
Average household wage, 1980 b) 81 16.0 2.4 9.2 22.0 
Region = Midwest (omitted) f) 81 0.210 0.410 0 1 
Region = North East f) 81 0.160 0.369 0 1 
Region = South f) 81 0.383 0.489 0 1 
Region = West f) 81 0.247 0.434 0 1 
Metro area has major border with coast f) 81 0.284 0.454 0 1 
Average temperature in January, measured between 1941-1970 g) 81 39.4 12.8 11.8 67.2 
Share land in topography classification that consists of plains g) 81 0.534 0.431 0 1 
Population density in metro area (per km2), 1880 i) 81 75.3 110.0 0.0278 647.7 
% Households with married couples and no children, 1990 b) 81 0.299 0.0357 0.203 0.451 
Percent change, housing units, 1990-2000 b) 81 0.135 0.0874 0.0266 0.484 
Percent change, housing units, 1980-1990 b) 81 0.207 0.154 0.0134 0.637 
Sources: a) Saiz (2008); b) US Census and Neighborhood Community Database (NCDB); c) National Land Cover Data 
(NLCD) 1976 and 1992 from the U.S. Geological Survey; Missing map cells for 1976 were obtained from Diego Puga at 
http://diegopuga.org/data/sprawl/. Map data was unavailable for Santa Cruz, California and a mis-projected map for Erie, 
Pennsylvania necessitated the removal of fourteen affected census tracts; d) Derived from NLCD and NCDB; e) Dave Leip’s 
Atlas of Presidential Elections; f) Derived from ESRI’s Census 2000 MSA-level shape file; g) Natural Amenity Scale Data 
from the Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture; h) Saks (2008); i) Interuniversity Consortium 
for Political and Social research (ICPSR) study #2896. Measure is based on historical MSA boundary definitions. 
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Table 2 
Base specification: Determinants of restrictiveness of land use regulations (N=93) 
 
  Second-stage 
 OLS 
First-stage 
TSLS TSLS LIML JIVE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent: WRLURI SDL 1992 SDL 1992 HOR 1990 WRLURI WRLURI WRLURI WRLURI 
1.981***    1.993** 2.299** 2.372** 2.599* Share developed residential land (SDL), 1992 
(0.512)    (0.953) (0.911) (0.985) (1.424) 
0.594 -0.221   0.599 3.674 4.248* 10.25* Homeownership rate (HOR), 1990 
(0.977) (0.175)   (0.842) (2.275) (2.556) (5.958) 
-48.29 -3.480 0.207 -6.623 -48.69 42.35 58.58 253.5 Population density in developed residential area 
(POPD), 1990 (75.63) (9.956) (13.22) (12.74) (83.91) (106.1) (114.0) (236.1) 
0.0429** -0.00254 -0.00232 -0.000687 0.0429** 0.0463** 0.0471** 0.0514** Share democratic votes in state,  
average 1988 and 1992 (0.0196) (0.00262) (0.00255) (0.00140) (0.0192) (0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0246) 
0.0167 0.00307*** 0.00346*** -0.000953 0.0167 0.0229 0.0240 0.0373* Household wage (in thousand dollar), 1990 
(0.0141) (0.00101) (0.00116) (0.00117) (0.0138) (0.0165) (0.0172) (0.0218) 
0.458* 0.0338 0.0389 -0.0271 0.457* 0.486** 0.490** 0.577* Region = Northeast 
(0.253) (0.0227) (0.0247) (0.0178) (0.237) (0.227) (0.228) (0.291) 
0.323* -0.109*** -0.104*** -0.00546 0.323** 0.436*** 0.457*** 0.691** Region = South 
(0.168) (0.0314) (0.0326) (0.0145) (0.159) (0.169) (0.173) (0.289) 
0.833*** -0.0808* -0.0706 -0.0315 0.833*** 0.991*** 1.020*** 1.334*** Region = West 
(0.169) (0.0448) (0.0435) (0.0218) (0.159) (0.206) (0.217) (0.354) 
 0.0786*** 0.0809*** -0.0207*     Metro area has major border with coast 
 (0.0227) (0.0219) (0.0114)     
 0.00510** 0.00523*** -0.00101     Average temperature in January, 1941-1970 
 (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.000674)     
 0.0201 0.0220 9.63e-07     Share metro area that is classified as consisting of 
plains 
 (0.0148) (0.0143) (0.0138)     
 105*** 112*** -4.04e-05*     Population density in 1880 
 (18.2) (22.) (2.18e-05)     
  -0.147 1.324***     Share households with married couples and no 
children in 1990 
  (0.350) (0.263)     
-3.361** 0.119 -0.0214 0.384*** -3.368*** -6.011*** -6.508*** -11.60** Constant 
(1.429) (0.197) (0.214) (0.141) (1.284) (2.214) (2.463) (5.249) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.377 0.594 0.586 0.658     
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic     12.0 5.6 5.6  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table 3 
Robustness check: Drop one instrument or any combination of two instruments at a time (N=93) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
PANEL A: First-stage / Dependent variable: Share developed residential land (SDL), 1992 
Excluded instruments: Baseline Drop one excluded instrument at a time Drop two excluded instruments at a time 
0.0809***  0.110*** 0.0838*** 0.0796***    0.117*** 0.105*** 0.0862*** Major border with coast 
(0.0219)  (0.0351) (0.0220) (0.0257)    (0.0386) (0.0368) (0.0263) 
0.00523*** 0.00639***  0.00541*** 0.00447**  0.00674*** 0.00563**   0.00479** Average January 
temperature (0.00189) (0.00229)  (0.00194) (0.00199)  (0.00242) (0.00237)   (0.00208) 
0.0220 0.0334** 0.0394*  0.0470** 0.0620*  0.0580**  0.0588**  Share plains 
(0.0143) (0.0163) (0.0232)  (0.0199) (0.0354)  (0.0218)  (0.0255)  
112*** 111*** 95*** 118***  87*** 121***  105***   Population density in 1880 
(22.3) (25.1) (23.3) (22.9)  (30.3) (26.4)  (22.4)   
-0.147 0.178 0.202 -0.220 0.119 0.799 0.0843 0.438 0.0905 0.389 -0.0132 Share married and no 
children (0.350) (0.454) (0.319) (0.354) (0.377) (0.606) (0.474) (0.485) (0.331) (0.355) (0.412) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.586 0.534 0.499 0.587 0.507 0.392 0.531 0.458 0.492 0.445 0.494 
 
PANEL B: Second-stage / TSLS / Dependent variable: WRLURI 
2.299** 1.963** 2.962** 2.114** 2.865*** 2.869** 1.604 2.566** 2.598** 3.805*** 2.463*** Share developed 
residential land (SDL) (0.911) (0.994) (1.186) (0.921) (0.940) (1.369) (1.074) (1.064) (1.155) (1.340) (0.953) 
3.674 3.947* 3.395 3.563 2.800 3.453 3.939 3.102 3.384 2.259 3.082 Homeownership rate 
(HOR) (2.275) (2.319) (2.211) (2.329) (2.445) (2.246) (2.408) (2.494) (2.268) (2.496) (2.423) 
42.35 67.28 2.013 47.13 -13.87 8.301 83.66 10.32 18.55 -76.06 14.47 Population density in 
developed residential area (106.1) (102.8) (121.1) (105.0) (126.9) (123.6) (100.5) (126.1) (118.7) (149.8) (119.4) 
0.0463** 0.0444** 0.0503** 0.0451** 0.0494*** 0.0498** 0.0421** 0.0477** 0.0480** 0.0550*** 0.0471** Share democratic votes 
(0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0187) (0.0199) (0.0205) (0.0188) (0.0200) (0.0191) (0.0192) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 5.6 7.4 12.4 6.9 11.2 6.6 9.8 7.5 16.4 8.2 12.4 
 PANEL C: Second-stage / LIML / Dependent variable: WRLURI 
2.372** 1.962* 3.081** 2.128** 2.962*** 3.007* 1.604 2.608** 2.619** 3.872*** 2.478** Share developed 
residential land (SDL) (0.985) (1.082) (1.315) (0.944) (1.036) (1.708) (1.075) (1.197) (1.188) (1.403) (0.987) 
4.248* 4.448* 3.719 3.739 3.079 3.764 3.941 3.406 3.477 2.288 3.203 Homeownership rate 
(HOR) (2.556) (2.565) (2.379) (2.419) (2.683) (2.485) (2.409) (2.755) (2.315) (2.561) (2.506) 
58.58 84.49 7.540 52.48 -8.812 12.52 83.76 18.78 20.70 -78.16 17.88 Population density in 
developed residential area (114.0) (110.7) (128.6) (107.5) (137.2) (143.5) (100.5) (139.1) (120.9) (154.0) (122.9) 
0.0471** 0.0446** 0.0512** 0.0453** 0.0502*** 0.0508** 0.0421** 0.0481** 0.0482** 0.0555*** 0.0472** Share democratic votes 
(0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0189) (0.0209) (0.0205) (0.0191) (0.0201) (0.0193) (0.0193) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 5.6 7.4 12.4 6.9 11.2 6.6 9.8 7.5 16.4 8.2 12.4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table 4 
Robustness check: Endogenize population density in developed residential area (N=93) 
 
 Second-stage First-stage 
TSLS LIML JIVE 
Dependent variable: SDL HOR PDDR WRLURI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   3.114*** 3.432** 3.185* Share developed residential land 
(SDL)    (0.939) (1.372) (1.634) 
   0.618 -0.188 4.846 Homeownership rate (HOR) 
   (3.802) (5.885) (7.876) 
   -185.6 -252.8 -17.36 Population density in developed 
residential area (POPD)    (216.3) (355.8) (424.8) 
-0.00232 -0.000785 1.47e-05 0.0502*** 0.0518*** 0.0526*** Share democratic votes 
(0.00251) (0.00136) (1.66e-05) (0.0179) (0.0182) (0.0194) 
0.00346*** -0.000866 -1.31e-05 0.0155 0.0133 0.0244 Household wage (in thousand 
dollar) (0.00118) (0.00113) (1.82e-05) (0.0188) (0.0237) (0.0213) 
0.0389 -0.0265 -9.34e-05 0.437* 0.418 0.484* Region = Northeast 
(0.0246) (0.0165) (0.000289) (0.243) (0.265) (0.262) 
-0.104*** -0.000763 -0.000708** 0.269 0.221 0.442 Region = South 
(0.0321) (0.0158) (0.000262) (0.227) (0.322) (0.407) 
-0.0706 -0.0294 -0.000307 0.847*** 0.808** 1.059** Region = West 
(0.0433) (0.0221) (0.000264) (0.231) (0.316) (0.426) 
0.0810*** -0.0244 0.000558**    Major border with coast 
(0.0231) (0.0153) (0.000258)    
0.00523*** -0.00112* 1.66e-05*    Average January temperature 
(0.00187) (0.000642) (9.44e-06)    
0.0219 0.00300 -0.000453**    Share plains 
(0.0148) (0.0127) (0.000212)    
113*** -51*** 1.6***    Population density in 1880 
(9.8) (5.9) (.11)    
-0.150 1.427*** -0.0155***    Share married and no children 
(0.307) (0.270) (0.00398)    
-0.0200 0.342** 0.00646*** -3.456 -2.796 -7.069 Constant 
(0.206) (0.138) (0.00156) (3.469) (5.202) (6.579) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.591 0.657 0.672    
Kleibergen-Paap statistic    2.0 2.0  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold 
coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table 5 
Robustness check: Use alternative measures to proxy for relative influence of owners of developed land (N=93) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 PANEL A: First stage / Dependent variable: Alternative proxy measures for the relative influence of owners of developed land 
 Alternative measures of share developed land (SDL) 
 Developed 
residential + 
industrial 
20 km radius, 
residential + 
industrial 
20 km radius, 
residential  
only 
Excluding 
parkland,  
res. + ind. 
Excluding 
parkland, 
res. only 
Average place 
in MSA,  
res. + ind. 
Av. place in 
MSA,  
res. only 
Median place 
in MSA,  
res. + ind. 
Median place 
in MSA,  
res. only 
Aggr. property 
value per m2 
developable 
land 
0.0896*** 0.127** 0.120** 0.102*** 0.0932*** 0.107*** 0.110*** 0.113** 0.121*** 21.33** Major border with coast 
(0.0236) (0.0563) (0.0536) (0.0284) (0.0275) (0.0392) (0.0387) (0.0452) (0.0443) (8.653) 
0.00557*** 0.00622 0.00694 0.00619* 0.00614* 0.00606* 0.00684** 0.00735** 0.00785** 0.749*** Average January 
temperature (0.00203) (0.00445) (0.00444) (0.00322) (0.00314) (0.00320) (0.00337) (0.00338) (0.00360) (0.225) 
0.0244 0.0725 0.0763 0.0227 0.0219 0.0523* 0.0450 0.0717* 0.0615 -3.828 Share plains 
(0.0165) (0.0525) (0.0517) (0.0200) (0.0174) (0.0301) (0.0306) (0.0392) (0.0386) (4.819) 
115*** 141*** 163*** 60** 61** 130*** 148*** 127*** 147*** 28,700*** Population density in 1880 
(22.6) (48.5) (50.6) (24.) (23.2) (34.8) (36.9) (43.1) (46.6) (8,820) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.579 0.242 0.278 0.376 0.357 0.322 0.359 0.325 0.357 0.755 
 PANEL B: Second-stage / Dependent variable: WRLURI / TSLS 
2.205*** 2.115*** 1.875*** 2.184*** 2.217*** 1.770*** 1.586*** 1.556*** 1.416*** 0.0105* Share developed residential 
land (SDL) (0.852) (0.768) (0.686) (0.797) (0.807) (0.642) (0.591) (0.564) (0.530) (0.00614) 
3.797 5.485** 5.055** 3.469 3.332 2.926 2.883 2.676 2.607 4.118* Homeownership rate (HOR) 
(2.324) (2.277) (2.325) (2.397) (2.352) (2.091) (2.070) (2.111) (2.108) (2.371) 
38.37 106.4 105.5 65.44 69.49 72.93 74.21 72.02 71.52 -40.17 Population density in 
developed residential area (108.0) (110.3) (110.4) (105.5) (103.7) (101.8) (101.8) (101.1) (102.3) (138.5) 
0.0483** 0.0498** 0.0467** 0.0500** 0.0474** 0.0438** 0.0413** 0.0473** 0.0437** 0.0455** Share democratic votes 
(0.0198) (0.0215) (0.0208) (0.0204) (0.0198) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0201) (0.0215) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 4.9 4.4 5.4 2.8 2.7 8.9 12.3 8.9 11.6 8.4 
 PANEL C: Second-stage / Dependent variable: WRLURI / LIML 
2.289** 2.323** 2.054** 2.309** 2.344** 1.897*** 1.690** 1.665*** 1.513*** 0.0122* Share developed residential 
land (SDL) (0.924) (0.911) (0.799) (0.923) (0.935) (0.721) (0.657) (0.622) (0.583) (0.00687) 
4.377* 6.040** 5.629** 4.046 3.902 3.257 3.255 2.934 2.887 4.977* Homeownership rate (HOR) 
(2.604) (2.425) (2.487) (2.667) (2.615) (2.262) (2.263) (2.263) (2.281) (2.648) 
53.82 115.1 116.5 80.81 85.13 80.60 83.83 77.85 78.28 -42.83 Population density in 
developed residential area (115.9) (114.4) (115.4) (114.0) (112.1) (107.5) (108.3) (106.5) (108.4) (153.5) 
0.0492** 0.0517** 0.0484** 0.0513** 0.0486** 0.0448** 0.0422** 0.0485** 0.0447** 0.0480** Share democratic votes 
(0.0203) (0.0223) (0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0204) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0223) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 4.9 4.4 5.4 2.8 2.7 8.9 12.3 8.9 11.6 8.4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table 6 
Robustness Check: Use data on land use and regulation from late 1970s/early 1980s and explain growth rate in housing supply (N=81) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PANEL A: First-stage and second-stage results (Explaining restrictiveness of land use regulation) 
OLS (First-stage) TSLS LIML TSLS LIML 
Dependent variables:: SDL 76 SDL 76 HOR 80 SAKS Regulatory Index 
   6.851*** 7.506*** 6.437*** 6.824*** Share developed residential land, 1976 (SDL 76) 
   (1.450) (1.704) (1.492) (1.597) 
-0.113   -0.724 -0.568 -3.269 -3.281 Homeownership rate, 1980 (HOR 80) 
(0.121)   (1.997) (2.076) (2.372) (2.424) 
1.534 4.425 -9.262 -26.81 -43.18 -96.34 -109.4 Population density in developed residential area, 1980 
(11.63) (12.20) (7.434) (130.3) (134.4) (147.3) (152.2) 
-0.00224 -0.00151 -0.00248 0.0245 0.0267 0.00936 0.0101 Share democratic votes in state, average 1972 and 1976 
(0.00315) (0.00314) (0.00156) (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0296) (0.0296) 
0.0314 0.0301 -0.0265     Major border with coast 
(0.0265) (0.0226) (0.0160)     
0.00451** 0.00440** -0.00172*     Average January temperature 
(0.00175) (0.00176) (0.000908)     
0.0388 0.0355 0.0186     Share plains 
(0.0427) (0.0428) (0.0154)     
0.000316** 0.000365*** -0.000261***     Population density in 1880 
(0.000129) (0.000116) (8.78e-05)     
 0.145 1.203***     Share married and no children 
 (0.220) (0.298)     
Other controls (incl. household wage) and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.307 0.305 0.642     
Kleibergen-Paap statistic    4.2 4.2 3.6 3.6 
    PANEL B: Explaining growth rate in housing supply 
Dependent variable:           Percent change in housing units 1990 to 2000 
   -0.0310*** -0.0293*** -0.0280*** -0.0271*** Predicted Saks-Index of Housing Supply Regulation 
   (0.00882) (0.00826) (0.00890) (0.00898) 
   0.364*** 0.364*** 0.360*** 0.360*** Percent change, housing units, 1980-1990 
   (0.0810) (0.0825) (0.0897) (0.0855) 
   0.0600*** 0.0600*** 0.0608*** 0.0608*** Constant 
   (0.0133) (0.0140) (0.0149) (0.0139) 
Adjusted R-squared    0.468 0.467 0.453 0.453 
Notes for both Panels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. Notes for Panel A: Robust standard errors in parentheses (obs. are clustered by US state). 
Region fixed effects and constant included (yes). Notes for Panel B: Standard errors are (robust) bootstrap standard errors (using 1000 bootstrap replications and clustering by US state.) 
 39 
 
Figures 
Figure 1. Regulatory restrictiveness and potential determinants. 
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Figure 2. Location equilibrium. 
 
fj 
1 
RHS of (6) 
Hj / H 0
 1
 
E 
LHS of (6) 
fjE 
HjE / H 
    40 
Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 1. By inspection, the RHS of (6) is decreasing in Hj and it belongs to the 
unit interval for any [0, ]jH H∈  (with complementary slackness), so there always exists a city 
j such that a positive mass of households desires to live in j. Conversely, the LHS of (6) is 
linearly increasing in Hj and it spans over the unit interval, all [0, ]jH H∈ . It follows that 
there exists at least one j ∈ ℑ  such that the LHS and the RHS intersect exactly once in the 
interior of the unit interval; in general, the LHS and the RHS intersect at most once for any 
k ∈ ℑ . QED. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Since the (necessary) second order condition (15) holds for any vector 
of taxes t, it is also sufficient to ensure that t0 in (13) characterizes the unique SPE of the 
game and that this equilibrium exists. QED. 
Proofs of Proposition 3 and Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2. The proofs of Proposition 3 and 
Corollary 3.1 follow by inspection of (13) and (14). We now lay out the algorithm that we use 
to derive these expressions, which is also helpful to build the intuition for these results. It is 
convenient to start with (iii). Using (10), Rj is increasing at 0jt =  by (11) and ( )jR ⋅  is 
concave by (15). Also, 0 (0, )jH H∈  by (16). Thus 0 0jt > . Then (ii) immediately follows from 
(12). Next turn to (i). Since (12) holds for all j it must also hold for the average city: 
0 (1 ) /jt Hτ κ κ= − . Using this, (7) and (12) into gives (13) and (14), from which (i) follows. 
Then (iv) follows from the fact that the coefficient of ( )jω ω−  in (13) belongs to the interior 
of the unit interval. (v) is a corollary of (iv) by (8). Part (vi) follows by inspection of 
0 (1 ) / ( ) / ( 1)jt H J H Jτ κ κ σ τ= − = + − . (vii) It follows from (13) that the variance of 0jt  is 
equal to  
2
0 1Var( ) Var( )12
j jt
J
κ
ω
κ
 
 
−
=  
 
− −
 
, 
which is decreasing in κ and hence decreasing in Hτ  by (11). QED. 
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Appendix B.  Appendix Tables not intended for publication 
Table U1 
MSA-level rankings of measures of regulatory restrictiveness and land scarcity 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Metropolitan Area 
Regulatory Tax 
in % of  
House Value 
1998 i) Rank 
Regulatory 
Index 2005 
ii)
 
Rank 
Regulatory 
Index   
late 1970s 
& 1980s ii) Rank 
Share 
Developed 
Land in %  
1992 iii) Rank 
Share 
Developed 
Land in% 
1976 iii) Rank 
San Francisco  53.1 1 0.78 5 2.10 2 20.8 10 25.4 8 
San Jose  46.9 2 0.21 10 1.65 3 19.9 12 25.2 9 
Los Angeles  33.9 3 0.50 8 1.21 4 44.2 1 54.7 1 
Oakland  32.1 4 0.63 7 0.10 14 26.6 5 27.6 6 
Washington, D.C.  21.9 5 0.21 10 0.86 6 10.2 17 16.1 16 
Newport News, VA  20.7 6 0.12 12  (-) 17.5 13 20.5 14 
Boston  18.6 7 1.67 2 0.86 7 33.2 4 33.9 3 
New York  12.2 8 0.67 6 2.21 1 43.9 2 50.7 2 
Manhattan >50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Salt Lake City  11.9 9 -0.03 17 0.96 5 23.3 6 28.8 4 
Chicago  5.7 10 0.01 16 -1.01 20 22.4 7 26.2 7 
Baltimore 1.8 11 1.65 3 0.80 8 14.2 15 18.3 15 
Birmingham  0 12 -0.24 18 -0.46 16 4.8 21 7.5 21 
Cincinnati  0 12 -0.58 21 0.16 12 9.3 18 14.8 18 
Detroit  0 12 0.07 14 -0.69 19 22.3 8 22.9 11 
Houston  0 12 -0.30 20 -0.52 17 14.8 14 12.3 19 
Minneapolis  0 12 0.38 9 -0.16 15 11.1 16 9.4 20 
Philadelphia  0 12 1.13 4 0.47 9 21.1 9 27.8 5 
Pittsburgh  0 12 0.08 13 0.26 11 8.5 19 15.4 17 
Providence  0 12 2.07 1 0.35 10 20.6 11 22.2 12 
Rochester  0 12 0.04 15 -0.68 18 5.3 20 21.8 13 
Tampa 0 12 -0.24 18 0.16 13 35.6 3 24.2 10 
Pair: Correlation  
Rank 
Correlation   Correlation  
Rank  
Correlation 
HOR 1990, (4) -0.61  -0.44  (2), HOR 1990 -0.24  -0.32  
HOR 1980, (5) -0.69  -0.39  (3), HOR 1980 -0.64  -0.45  
(1), (2) 0.12  0.37  (1), (4)  0.33  0.36  
(1), (3) 0.68  0.65  (2), (4)  0.28  0.31  
(1), HOR 1990 -0.52  -0.68  (3), (5)  0.50  0.34  
Sources: i) Estimated regulatory tax values are from Glaeser et al. (2005a). ii) Regulatory index values are from Saiz (2008) 
and Saks (2008 respectively. iii) The share developed land measures are derived from the 1992 and 1976 National Land 
Cover Data. Homeownership rates (HOR) are from the 1990 and 1980 US Census (tract level data geographically matched 
to the metropolitan area level). 
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Table U2 
Relationship between land scarcity and restrictiveness of land use regulations (N=93) 
Method: OLS 
  
 Dependent Variable: WRLURI from 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1.778*** 1.340** 1.411** 2.018*** 1.950*** 1.950*** 1.981*** Share developed, 1992 
(SDL) (0.598) (0.621) (0.554) (0.498) (0.555) (0.555) (0.512) 
 -1.729* -1.976 -1.296 -1.045 -1.045 0.594 Homeownership rate, 
1990 (HOR) 
 (0.969) (1.249) (1.083) (1.140) (1.140) (0.977) 
  -26.56 -82.67 -78.23 -78.23 -48.29 Population density in 
developed area, 1990 
  (84.99) (80.12) (82.71) (82.71) (75.63) 
   0.0625*** 0.0586*** 0.0586*** 0.0429** Share democratic votes in 
state, average 1988/1992 
   (0.0180) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0196) 
    0.0145 0.0145 0.0167 Household wage (in 
thousand US dollar), 1990 
    (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0141) 
      0.458* North East 
      (0.253) 
      0.323* South 
      (0.168) 
West       0.833*** 
       (0.169) 
-0.104 1.036 1.252 -2.155* -2.557** -2.557** -3.361** Constant 
(0.101) (0.628) (0.962) (1.260) (1.258) (1.258) (1.429) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.086 0.100 0.092 0.259 0.261 0.261 0.377 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table U3 
Robustness check: Replicate Table 5 but with 3 endogenous variables (N=93) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 PANEL A: First stage / Dependent variable: Alternative proxy measures for the relative influence of owners of developed land 
 Alternative measures of share developed land (SDL) 
 Developed 
residential + 
industrial 
20 km radius, 
residential + 
industrial 
20 km radius, 
residential  
only 
Excluding 
parkland,  
res. + ind. 
Excluding 
parkland, 
res. only 
Average place 
in MSA,  
res. + ind. 
Av. place in 
MSA,  
res. only 
Median place 
in MSA,  
res. + ind. 
Median place 
in MSA,  
res. only 
Aggr. property 
value per m2 
developable 
land 
0.0913*** 0.115** 0.105* 0.102*** 0.0914*** 0.0957** 0.0967** 0.102** 0.107** 25.38*** Major border with coast 
(0.0247) (0.0549) (0.0523) (0.0297) (0.0285) (0.0403) (0.0396) (0.0460) (0.0452) (8.735) 
0.00562*** 0.00587 0.00650 0.00618* 0.00609* 0.00572* 0.00643* 0.00702** 0.00746** 0.869*** Average January 
temperature (0.00199) (0.00446) (0.00447) (0.00321) (0.00316) (0.00317) (0.00336) (0.00333) (0.00358) (0.215) 
0.0231 0.0822 0.0885* 0.0230 0.0234 0.0616* 0.0560 0.0806* 0.0724* -7.116 Share plains 
(0.0164) (0.0532) (0.0524) (0.0203) (0.0180) (0.0344) (0.0348) (0.0433) (0.0423) (4.395) 
120*** 107*** 121*** 59*** 56*** 98*** 109*** 96*** 109*** 40,200*** Population density in 1880 
(10.8) (24.8) (24.6) (16) (15.4) (16.1) (16.7) (19.4) (19.9) (3300) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.584 0.245 0.278 0.383 0.365 0.322 0.356 0.328 0.356 0.737 
 PANEL B: Second-stage / Dependent variable: WRLURI / TSLS 
2.913*** 2.483*** 2.287*** 2.383*** 2.439*** 2.313*** 2.145*** 1.896*** 1.808*** 0.0217*** Share developed residential 
land (SDL) (0.886) (0.865) (0.749) (0.823) (0.824) (0.765) (0.708) (0.598) (0.577) (0.00751) 
0.923 3.465 2.767 2.129 1.913 -0.337 -0.562 -0.0288 -0.476 -0.802 Homeownership rate (HOR) 
(3.757) (3.433) (3.578) (3.607) (3.640) (3.850) (3.903) (3.714) (3.901) (4.684) 
-177.7 -42.97 -62.53 -22.25 -22.52 -137.6 -148.5 -97.10 -121.7 -590.5* Population density in 
developed residential area (214.5) (198.5) (202.5) (178.5) (179.5) (201.8) (205.8) (190.4) (201.3) (350.4) 
0.0523*** 0.0519** 0.0489** 0.0511*** 0.0484*** 0.0461** 0.0433** 0.0496*** 0.0458** 0.0577** Share democratic votes 
(0.0180) (0.0209) (0.0202) (0.0192) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0242) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.4 
 PANEL C: Second-stage / Dependent variable: WRLURI / LIML 
3.177** 2.671** 2.481*** 2.494** 2.567** 2.540** 2.407** 2.079*** 2.013*** 0.0267** Share developed residential 
land (SDL) (1.241) (1.044) (0.937) (1.115) (1.152) (1.007) (1.016) (0.759) (0.779) (0.0115) 
0.323 3.497 2.665 2.710 2.388 -1.101 -1.631 -0.709 -1.431 -2.620 Homeownership rate (HOR) 
(5.641) (3.917) (4.276) (5.573) (5.805) (5.007) (5.496) (4.890) (5.376) (6.735) 
-232.7 -59.04 -86.54 -2.614 -8.636 -189.9 -219.6 -142.4 -183.0 -809.3 Population density in 
developed residential area (341.1) (233.6) (251.2) (296.4) (308.3) (270.7) (301.6) (257.1) (285.9) (553.4) 
0.0540*** 0.0534** 0.0503** 0.0523*** 0.0495*** 0.0474** 0.0445** 0.0512*** 0.0472** 0.0632** Share democratic votes 
(0.0183) (0.0214) (0.0206) (0.0199) (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0195) (0.0198) (0.0284) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table U4 
Replicate Table 6 with reduced set of (statistically significant) excluded instruments (N=81) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PANEL A: First-stage and second-stage results (Explaining restrictiveness of land use regulation) 
OLS (First-stage) TSLS LIML TSLS LIML 
Dependent variables:: SDL 76 SDL 76 HOR 80 SAKS Regulatory Index 
   7.015*** 7.091*** 6.620*** 6.628*** Share developed residential land, 1976 (SDL 76) 
   (1.533) (1.555) (1.535) (1.537) 
-0.0958   -0.685 -0.667 -2.419 -2.419 Homeownership rate, 1980 (HOR 80) 
(0.142)   (2.043) (2.052) (2.303) (2.304) 
0.141 3.469 -9.679 -30.91 -32.81 -74.58 -74.83 Population density in developed residential area (POPD), 1980 
(12.40) (13.31) (7.386) (130.3) (130.7) (139.6) (139.7) 
-0.00266 -0.00182 -0.00307** 0.0250 0.0253 0.0145 0.0145 Share democratic votes in state, average 1972 and 1976 
(0.00277) (0.00277) (0.00133) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0299) 
0.0117*** 0.0132*** 0.000599 -0.0210 -0.0213 -0.0266 -0.0267 Household wage (in thousand US dollar), 1980 
(0.00313) (0.00257) (0.00330) (0.0418) (0.0419) (0.0410) (0.0410) 
0.00576*** 0.00543*** -0.00228**     Average January temperature 
(0.00162) (0.00179) (0.00100)     
412*** 453*** -312***     Population density in 1880 
(104) (85.3) (71)     
 0.235 1.151***     Share married and no children 
 (0.242) (0.292)     
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.301 0.303 0.631     
Kleibergen-Paap statistic    5.0 5.0 3.9 3.9 
    PANEL B: Explaining growth rate in housing supply 
Dependent variable::           Percent change in housing units 1990 to 2000 
   -0.0316*** -0.0314*** -0.0296** -0.0296*** Predicted Saks-Index of Housing Supply Regulation 
   (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0124) (0.0115) 
   0.365*** 0.365*** 0.362*** 0.362*** Percent change, housing units, 1980-1990 
   (0.0818) (0.0814) (0.0873) (0.0853) 
   2.75e-09 2.73e-09 1.48e-09 1.48e-09 Housing units (in million units), 1990  
   (1.22e-08) (1.33e-08) (1.35e-08) (1.29e-08) 
   0.0580*** 0.0580*** 0.0595*** 0.0595*** Constant 
   (0.0186) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0185) 
Adjusted R-squared    0.461 0.461 0.451 0.451 
Notes for both Panels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. Notes for Panel A: Robust standard errors in parentheses (obs. are clustered by US state). 
Region fixed effects and constant included (yes). Notes for Panel B: Standard errors are (robust) bootstrap standard errors (using 1000 bootstrap replications and clustering by US state.) 
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Table U5 
Robustness Check: Findings for ‘contemporaneous’ and ‘70s/80s’ specifications  
restricted to joint sample of metropolitan areas (N=63) 
 
 Second-stage 
 
First-stage OLS 
TSLS LIML 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PANEL A 
Dependent variables: SDL WRLURI, 2005 
 1.979*** 3.565*** 4.677** Share developed, 1992 (SDL) 
 (0.611) (0.977) (1.821) 
 0.593 2.408 3.537 Homeownership rate, 1990 (HOR) 
 (1.183) (1.867) (2.367) 
23.80** -19.54 -11.29 -11.55 Population density in developed area, 1990 
(POPD) (11.63) (94.60) (125.7) (153.2) 
-0.00504* 0.0257 0.0382* 0.0468** Share democratic votes in state,  
average 1988 and 1992 (0.00264) (0.0231) (0.0206) (0.0219) 
0.00263 0.0248 0.0259 0.0265 Household wage (in thousand US dollar),  
1990   (0.00155) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0201) 
0.0831**    Major border with coast 
(0.0359)    
0.00500**    Average January temperature 
(0.00200)    
0.0567**    Share plains 
(0.0263)    
42    Population density in 1880 
(145)    
-0.112    Share married and no children 
(0.423)    
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
0.0709 -2.826* -4.859*** -6.161*** Constant 
(0.226) (1.626) (1.854) (2.383) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.451 0.315   
Kleibergen-Paap-statistic   4.4 4.4 
PANEL B 
Dependent variables: SDL SAKS, late 70s/early 80s 
 2.362*** 6.911*** 10.16*** Share developed, 1976 (SDL 76) 
 (0.653) (1.548) (3.798) 
 -3.406** -1.207 1.262 Homeownership rate, 1980 (HOR 80) 
 (1.571) (3.166) (4.124) 
-5.112 -34.94 -87.86 -89.41 Population density in developed area, 1980 
(POPD 80) (21.74) (76.32) (145.4) (213.0) 
-0.00202 0.00159 0.0212 0.0395 Share democratic votes in state, average 1972 
and 1976 (0.00316) (0.0312) (0.0264) (0.0305) 
0.000291 -0.0250 0.0116 0.0452 Household wage (in thousand US dollar),  
1980   (0.00480) (0.0576) (0.0605) (0.0694) 
0.0520*    Major border with coast 
(0.0296)    
0.00440**    Average January temperature 
(0.00198)    
0.0421    Share plains 
(0.0480)    
266    Population density in 1880 
(165)    
-0.852    Share married and no children 
(0.774)    
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
0.278 2.123 -1.195 -4.573 Constant 
(0.275) (2.248) (3.800) (5.113) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.295 0.270   
Kleibergen-Paap-statistic   1.8 1.8 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table U6 
Additional Robustness Checks: Remove Californian metro areas, New York City, or both 
 
 Exclude CA Exclude NYC Exclude CA and NYC 
 PANEL A: First-stage / Dependent variable: Share developed land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 0.0787***   0.0770***   0.0727***  Major border with coast 
 (0.0260)   (0.0203)   (0.0252)  
 0.00636***   0.00542***   0.00620**  Average January temperature 
 (0.00227)   (0.00181)   (0.00234)  
 0.0160   0.0191   0.0166  Share plains 
 (0.0175)   (0.0148)   (0.0181)  
 108***   137***   136***  Population density in 1880 
 (25.3)   (21.8)   (32.1)  
 0.0820   -0.143   0.0917  Share married and no children 
 (0.333)   (0.349)   (0.322)  
Other controls and constant  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  82   92   81  
Adjusted R-squared  0.621   0.582   0.614  
 PANEL B: Second-stage / Dependent variable: WRLURI 
 OLS TSLS LIML OLS TSLS LIML OLS TSLS LIML 
2.336*** 2.841*** 2.955*** 1.981*** 2.395*** 2.490** 2.332*** 2.924*** 3.042*** Share developed residential land 
(SDL) (0.483) (0.988) (1.073) (0.510) (0.924) (1.001) (0.481) (1.017) (1.104) 
0.976 4.817* 5.584* 0.598 3.978** 4.448** 0.900 5.466*** 6.039*** Homeownership rate (HOR) 
(1.085) (2.595) (2.990) (1.026) (1.984) (2.145) (1.197) (2.025) (2.205) 
-31.86 76.94 98.08 -48.43 30.62 39.86 -29.04 75.04 86.22 Population density in developed 
residential area (POPD) (82.91) (103.3) (111.5) (77.95) (87.93) (89.60) (89.16) (83.66) (83.78) 
0.0475** 0.0531*** 0.0543*** 0.0429** 0.0462** 0.0469** 0.0477** 0.0527*** 0.0536** Share democratic votes 
(0.0189) (0.0196) (0.0203) (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0191) (0.0204) (0.0209) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 82 82 82 92 92 92 81 81 81 
Adjusted R-squared 0.369   0.372   0.362   
Kleibergen-Paap statistic  4.9 4.9  5.2 5.2  4.9 4.9 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table U7 
Additional Robustness Checks: Add interaction ‘share democratic voters’ x household wage 
and drop variable ‘share democratic voters’ (N=93) 
 
 Add interaction SDV x wage Drop variable ‘share democratic voters’ 
 PANEL A: First-stage / Dependent variable: Share developed land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 0.0797***   0.0784***  Major border with coast 
 (0.0224)   (0.0216)  
 0.00519**   0.00541***  Average January temperature 
 (0.00197)   (0.00190)  
 0.0219   0.0262*  Share plains 
 (0.0141)   (0.0134)  
 114***   117***  Population density in 1880 
 (23.7)   (20.7)  
 -0.175   -0.116  Share married and no children 
 (0.409)   (0.342)  
Other controls and constant  Yes   Yes  
Adjusted R-squared  0.582   0.586  
 PANEL B: Second-stage / Dependent variable: WRLURI 
 OLS TSLS LIML OLS TSLS LIML 
2.039*** 2.609** 2.812** 1.571*** 1.699* 1.740* Share developed residential 
land (SDL) (0.496) (1.060) (1.209) (0.543) (0.949) (1.012) 
0.803 4.421 5.438 0.307 3.437 4.009 Homeownership rate (HOR) 
(1.016) (2.768) (3.366) (1.170) (2.243) (2.508) 
-38.75 70.30 99.07 -37.93 63.27 80.97 Population density in developed 
residential area (POPD) (79.19) (115.0) (129.6) (85.62) (105.4) (112.6) 
0.0897 0.201 0.234*    Share democratic votes 
(0.115) (0.127) (0.142)    
-0.00154 -0.00509 -0.00612    Share democratic votes x 
household wage (0.00370) (0.00405) (0.00449)    
0.0938 0.277 0.329    Household wage  
 (0.189) (0.207) (0.231)    
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.371   0.326   
Kleibergen-Paap statistic  3.4 3.4  6.4 6.4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
 
    48 
Table U8 
Quantitative effects 
 
 Relative change in land scarcity 
(Change in percent) 
Absolute change in land scarcity 
(Change in percentage points) 
 Effect of major access to coast line 
Table 2 (3) +65.2% +8.1% 
 Effect of one std. dev. increase in January temperature 
Table 2 (3) +52.7% +6.5% 
 Effect of one std. dev. increase in ‘share plains’ 
Table 2 (3) +7.7% +0.95% 
 Effect of one std. dev. increase in historic population density 
Table 2 (3) +44.3% +5.5% 
 Effect of increase of share developed land by one standard deviation  
(+12.2 / +10.4 percentage points) on regulatory restrictiveness 
 Change in regulatory index Change in rank order 
Table 2 (1) (OLS) +0.24  47  37 
Table 2 (6) (TSLS) +0.26   47  36 
Table 2 (7) (LIML) +0.27  47  36 
Table 4 (4) (TSLS) +0.35  47  33 
Table 4 (5) (LIML) +0.38  47  31 
Table 6A (6) (TSLS) +0.67  41  21 
Table 6A (7) (LIML) +0.71  41  20 
 Effect of an increase in the homeownership rate by one standard deviation  
(+7.0 / +7.4 percentage points) on regulatory restrictiveness 
 Change in regulatory index Change in rank order 
Table 2 (1) (OLS) (+0.042)  (47  46)  
Table 2 (6) (TSLS) (+0.26)  (47  36)  
Table 2 (7) (LIML) (+0.30)  (47  35)  
Table 4 (4) (TSLS) (+0.043)  (47  46)  
Table 4 (5) (LIML) (-0.013)  (47 - unchanged)  
Table 6A (6) (TSLS) (-0.23)  (41  50)  
Table 6A (7) (LIML) (-0.23)  (41  50)  
 Effect of increase in predicted regulatory index (SAKS) by one standard deviation 
(+1.0) on the growth rate of housing supply 
 Change in the growth rate of housing 
supply between 1990 and 2000 
(Change in percentage points) 
Change in rank order 
 
Table 6B (6) -2.8% 41 → 54 
Table 6B (7) -2.7% 41 → 54 
Notes: The marginal effects are measured at the means of the independent variables. The marginal effect of 
having major access to a coast is measured for an MSA that does not have major access to a coast compared to 
one that has access. The change in rank order is calculated for the MSA with the median regulatory index and 
the median growth rate, respectively.  Effect is not statistically significant.  Effect is only marginally 
statistically significant. 
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Appendix C. Multinomial logit discrete choice model (not intended for 
publication) 
In this appendix we replace the multinomial uniform discrete choice model of section 3 by the 
multinomial logit (MNL) discrete choice model. The aim is to show that the theoretical 
predictions of Proposition 2 also hold in this case. 
We replace (2) by 
( ) ln ( )j j ju h V hε= +  
and assume that the εj’s are iid distributed according to the double exponential distribution 
with dispersion parameter σ. As a result, we replace (2) by 
( )
( )
exp ln /
exp ln /
j
j
k
k
Vf
V
σ
σ
∈ℑ
=
∑
.           (21) 
Simplifying (21) yields 
1/
1/
j
j
k
k
Vf
V
σ
σ
∈ℑ
=
∑
. 
The determinants of Vj are the same as in the model of Section 3. The equilibrium condition 
(6) can now be rewritten as  
( )
( )
1/
1/:
j j jj j
j
k k k
k
t HH Hj f
H H t H
σ
σ
ω τ
ω τ
+
∈ℑ+
− −
∀ ∈ ℑ = ⇒ =
− −∑
.       (22) 
That is, the fraction of people living in j is increasing in the well-being net of the regulatory 
tax of j and decreasing in the well-being net of regulatory tax of cities k≠ j. It follows from 
(22) that the most desirable locations have a larger than average population. To see this, 
substitute the variables pertaining to location j in (22) by the corresponding averages and take 
the ratio of the two to get:  
( )
( )
1/
1/
j j jj t HH
H t H
σ
σ
ω τ
ω τ
− −
=
− −
 
which implies (i) j j jt t H Hω ω− = − ⇔ =  and (ii) given H , d / d( ) 0j j jH tω − > . Together, 
these in turn imply j j jH H t tω ω> ⇔ − > − , as was to be shown. 
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The location equilibrium exists and is unique; the method of proof is equivalent to the one of 
Proposition 1 in the main text. 
In order to obtain closed form solutions for both jH  and Vj, let us next normalize the variance 
of εj so that σ = 1. In this case, solving (22) for Hj and plugging the outcome into (5) yields: 
( ), 1j j j j j jH t HV tH t t
ω τ
ω
ω ω
−  
= = − − 
− − 
.       (23) 
Planning boards maximize (9) non-cooperatively, anticipating (23). The first order conditions 
that solve this program and replace (12) can be written implicitly as ( j∀ ∈ ℑ ):  
( ) ( )
0 0
0 00 0
max 0,
/
j
j j j
t t H
V t Ht t J
ω τ
ω τω ω
 
− 
= − 
− −
− − −  
 
where 0jV  is the level of welfare (23) evaluated at the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).  
Finally, replacing assumption (16) by / 2Hτ ω< , one can show that the set { }00 : 0jj tℑ ≡ >  
is not empty and, using the same method of proof as for Proposition 2 in the main text, one 
can show that the properties of the SPE are qualitatively identical in the MNL model to the 
ones of the multinomial uniform model, as was to be shown.  
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